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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the performance of a twelve
channel Standard Positioning Service (SPS) based Global Positioning System (GPS)
receiver using an eight state Kaiman filter in a hostile radio frequency (RF)
environment and to develop instructional tools for teaching RF interference on GPS
receivers. The two types of jamming signals generated included Continuous Wave
(CW) and Swept CW. Actual GPS and jamming signals were used in the research.
The signals received from GPS satellites exhibit a Doppler shift which
vary between approximately ± six Kilohertz. The Doppler shift frequency can be
reasonably predicted for a given time of day, for a given satellite, and for a known
receiver location using GPS satellite almanac or ephemeris data. Additionally, the
Pseudorandom Noise (PRN) Coarse Acquisition (C/A) code for each satellite exhibits
specific maximum amplitude spectral lines. By tailoring the jamming signals to match
with the Doppler shifted satellite frequencies and offsetting the jamming to a maximum
spectral line, it was shown that individual Navstar XR5-M receiver channels for specific
satellites could be selectively jammed/spoofed.
Swept CW jamming resulted in pulling the XR5-M receiver tracking channels
off frequency by up to 20 Kilohertz but resulted in a maximum position error of only
220 meters. The CW jamming of at least one of the XR5-M receiver channels resulted
in position errors in the receiver in excess of 12 kilometers.

xm

ANALYSIS OF RADIO FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE EFFECTS
ON A MODERN COARSE ACQUISITION CODE (C/A)
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) RECEIVER

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND
In 1973 the United States (US) military formed a Joint Program Office (JPO) to
address the proliferation of navigation systems in the US Armed Forces and to develop
precision weapon delivery systems. The desired solution was to be a common system
that could provide worldwide coverage and be useable by all NATO military services.
The result was a ground-controlled spaced-based system known as the NAVSTAR
Global Positioning System (GPS).
Recently a great deal of interest has resulted from potential loss or degradation
of GPS signals due to Radio Frequency (RF) Interference (RFI). This thesis will
investigate the effects of jamming GPS satellite signals received by a Standard
Positioning Service (SPS) Coarse Acquisition (C/A) code based receiver.
The GPS satellite constellation consists of 24 satellites in six orbital planes with
four satellites per plane at an altitude of 20,183.6 km in approximately 12 hour, nearly
circular orbits with an inclination of 55 degrees from the equatorial plane. On the earth
are five monitor stations used to track and upload the satellites with the most recent
1-1

navigational information regarding the constellation. The system received Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) status on December 8, 1993. While the system was
originally developed for the military, the applications for GPS have exploded in the
civil markets. The popularity of the system has resulted in handheld receivers now
costing less than $100 US. More recently, there has been a great deal of interest in
aircraft traffic control systems using GPS known as Wide Area Augmentation System
(WAAS) and Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) [PAR96].
The GPS system was originally designed to meet military needs; however,
enormous growth in the civil sector has lead to many innovative uses of GPS.
Originally the system was to provide the military a more accurate three dimensional
navigation solution accuracy of 16 meters spherical error probable (SEP) while civil
users could expect a somewhat degraded position error solution of 100 meters
(2DRMS). Signal processing developments and multi-receiver implementations have
provided civil users with centimeter accuracy. As the civil sector continues to become
more dependent on the GPS signals, there has been a desire for increased accuracy and
robustness. In order to achieve improved accuracy and robustness, there has been a
growing interest in sources of interference to the GPS signals.
Although the military operates GPS receivers which are reported to be jam
resistant, a 1998 incident with the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Information
Directorate facility at Griffis AFB, Newport, New York raised serious concerns about
the use of stand-alone GPS in civil aviation. The lab had been conducting a test with a
five watt transmitter and inadvertently left the system transmitting in the civil GPS
1-2

frequency band over a ten day period. The incident resulted in at least 16 different
reports to the FAA from civilian aviators including a Continental Airlines flight. The
FAA declared an interference zone of 300 kilometers until they investigated the
problem and advised the Research Laboratory [GWM98].
The "New Scientist" article of 10 January 1998, stated that a Russian company
called " Aviaconversia" was offering a four watt GPS/GLONASS jammer for under
$4000 US at the September 1997 Moscow Air Show. The article claimed that the
jammer was capable of preventing civilian aircraft from locking on to GPS signals over
a 200 km radius [SEI98].
The combination of the incident at the AFRL and the GPS jamming equipment
at the 1997 Moscow Air Show sparked interest into the GPS jamming effects on civil
aviation. The potential chaos created by a simple four watt transmitter on a solely GPSbased air traffic control system has raised some doubt about the current plans to phase
out many ground based navigation systems. In particular, the US Congress recently
expressed reluctance to phase out a ground-based system known as Loran. The US
Congress expressed concern over the findings of the US Presidential Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection that reported sole reliance on satellites for aviation
could be hazardous. After reviewing the Department of Transport's (DoT) 1999 budget
proposal, the US Congress directed the DoT to provide funds to operate Loran system
as a backup to GPS until at least 2008 [PRI99].
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In a hostile RF environment, a jammer signal could be used to either degrade or
completely deny the use of the GPS signals. The GPS signal structure and forms of RF
interference are discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The US government funded and developed GPS primarily as a military system;
however, there has been exponential growth worldwide in civilian applications. Even
though the US government has provided assurances that the GPS signals would remain
on during time of conflict [DOD97], US defense forces require the ability to deny an
adversary the use of GPS. In future conflicts US forces will be required to deny an
adversary's use of GPS by local area jamming and spoofing of the GPS signals. US
universities and research and development organizations have been conducting GPS
jamming trials for several years; however, detailed results of these trials are generally
classified and are not available to foreign military.
The Canadian Forces (CF) currently operates a mixed fleet of military aircraft,
in some cases using only C/A code receivers such as the Trimble Trimpack receiver in
the CF Sea King (H3) helicopter. Shrinking Canadian defense budgets have raised
questions regarding the military requirements for P(Y) code receivers and the associated
costly antenna systems if the position and velocity accuracy of off-the-shelf C/A Code
receivers with simple integration to other systems may suffice. Additionally, in future
conflicts, it will be necessary for the Canadian Forces to maintain a war fighting
capability while at the same time denying an adversary the use of GPS signals, thus a
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jam resistant system will be critical to ensure adequate GPS availability. Interoperability with US forces will remain essential.
The loss of position, velocity, and an accurate timing reference due to
interference to GPS signals is a major concern to the Canadian Forces. The sponsor for
this research effort, the Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Studies (CFSAS) at
Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, requested thesis research to
be conducted in the field of Navigation Warfare (NavWar). This thesis research
provides an insight into effective techniques for jamming a C/A code receiver at the
unclassified level and means to mitigate these effects.

1.3 SUMMARY OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE
Two leading textbooks on GPS [PAR96, KAP96] provide an excellent
introduction into understanding GPS signal structure and RF interference effects on
GPS. In particular Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of [KAP96] written by Mr. Phillip Ward, were
used extensively in developing Chapter 2 of this thesis. Previous research into the
jamming of GPS is highlighted in this section.
The Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) Weapons Division at China Lake has
developed a limited number of small soda-can size GPS jammers. Based on discussions
with NAWC staff, the basic characteristics are as follows: the unit operates at 200
milliwatts and has a RS232 port on the bottom allowing it to be programmed to
generate various jamming signals. The unit should be positioned upright for jamming
signals to be effective. Follow-on research is planned to investigate the ability to air
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launch the units with a retarding system and for the units to be remotely programmed
[NAW98].
The NAWC Weapons GPS/INS Section Navigation Laboratory has developed a
GPS Receiver and Integration Test Facility using a IEC SCS2400 GPS Satellite
Constellation Simulator, a STel 7200 GPS Satellite Signal Simulator, and aNavLab
GPS Jammer System. Up to four jammers per LI and L2 may be generated with
variable power levels from 20 to 80 dB J/S over the full GPS spectrum including
narrow-band, continuous waveform, pulsed, and narrow-band and wide-band with
pseudo-random Gaussian distributed noise sequences. National Instruments Labview
software is used extensively in the user interface design [BOG97, RAS97].
The NavWar Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) program
was funded for up to $55M to be completed in FY99 to demonstrate NavWar protection
and prevention technologies. Under this program electronic warfare enhancements are
being developed and implemented on the Miniaturized Airborne GPS Receiver
(MAGR), Embedded GPS/INS (EGI), and the handheld Precision Lightweight GPS
Receiver (PLGR) [WWW1].
At least two companies are now marketing commercial products used to reduce
the effects of RF interference to GPS receivers; Electro-Radiation Inc (ERI) of
Fairfield, New Jersey, and Mayflower Communications Co from Billerica, MA. The
Interference Suppression Unit (ISU), marketed by ERI, was combined with a MAGR
and tested in May 1997 at Holloman AFB [BRAROS98, BRASNY98]. The flight
testing, at White Sands Missile Range, was composed of five surface, high power, Right
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Hand Circularly Polarized (RHCP), wide-band noise jammers and one airborne, RHCP,
wide-band noise jammer. Results indicated that the ISU provides more than 20 dB of
broadband noise margin [BRAROS98]. Electro-Radiation reports that the ISU also
provides greater than 35 dB of narrow-band interference noise margin while
maintaining code and carrier tracking.
Mayflower Communications has designed the AIC-2100 to reduce pulsed, CW
and narrow-band interference and jamming by an improvement of up to 50 dB
[UPT98]. A digital temporal filter is effective against narrow-band interference while
antenna spatial filter techniques are effective against both narrow-band and wide-band
sources of RFI. The AIC-2100 is designed to be operated at RF and would be a
potential quick fix to mitigate narrow-band types of jamming; however, antenna beamforming would still be required to suppress broadband sources of jamming [WWW2].
A presentation at the Institute of Navigation (ION) GPS Conference in
September, 1998 in Nashville, Tennessee, highlighted research into direct Y code
acquisition [ROU98]. A P(Y)-code receiver normally requires the Hand Over Word
(HOW) from the C/A code to get P(Y) code lock. This presents an inherent
vulnerability to a P(Y)-code receiver while in acquisition mode if the C/A code is being
jammed and is therefore unable to get lock on the P(Y)-code. Not surprisingly, direct
access to the encrypted P(Y) code for military users is one of the key elements of future
"enhanced GPS" requirements passed into law by President Clinton in 1998 [ION98].
A potential wartime scenario would likely consist of US forces "carpet
jamming" an entire area, thus negating the effective use of most C/A code receivers.
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This scenario is reasonable provided direct P(Y) code acquisition is obtainable. The
papers presented at ION-98 Conference highlighted that the hardware has been
designed to meet these requirements [ROU98, WOL98].

1.4 ASSUMPTIONS
The thesis assumes that the performance of the Navstar XR5-M Receiver is
typical of a C/A code receiver of mid 1990s technology. The Defense Mapping Agency
1988 survey of the AFIT Building 640 rooftop was assumed to be still valid.

1.5 SCOPE
The thesis investigates the theoretical and actual performance figures for a
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 12 channel Navstar XR5-M receiver in the presence
of interference sources, specifically CW and swept CW signals. Actual data was first
collected for the Navstar XR5-M receiver without jamming in order to establish
baseline performance of the receiver. Performance of the XR5-M Receiver in the
presence of actual interference signals was then measured. The primary area of
research was the investigation of selectively jamming/spoofing an individual satellite
signal at the GPS receiver using CW and swept CW signals, prior knowledge of a
satellite's pseudorandom noise code, and the Doppler shift of the satellite signals. A
comparison of position error as a result of CW and swept CW was also conducted.
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1.6 APPROACH
Previous thesis work in the area of jamming of GPS signals at the US Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) made use of modeling and simulations. This thesis will
present an analysis of actual GPS signals in the presence of real interference sources. A
secondary goal of the thesis was to demonstrate RFI effects on GPS as part of the
Advanced GPS Course taught by the Electrical Engineering Department at AFIT and as
part of the course curriculum taught at the Canadian Forces School of Aerospace
Studies at Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. Several jamming scenarios were investigated
within

funding limitations and available equipment at the time of the research.

1.7 MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT
The main hardware components were two Navstar XR5-M 12 Channel GPS
Receivers used in conjunction with Navstar software version 3.7 on two 486 Personal
Computers (PC); the first receiver was used as a Base Station and the second was used
as a mobile receiver. The PC computer display was used to control the receiver setups,
configuration and for capturing XR5-M GPS data to file. The two Navstar receivers
were used in a differential/relative GPS mode. Two Navstar GPS volute antennas with
built in pre-amps were located on the AFIT Building 640 rooftop. An older Hewlett
Packard (HP) spectrum analyzer was first used but did not provide accurate enough
measurement of the signal generator output. The second HP spectrum analyzer was
acceptable but initial testing using two Wavetek signal generators revealed that the
Wavetek equipment was unsuitable due to frequency instability at GPS LI frequencies.
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The jamming hardware was finally achieved using an HP signal generator, an HP
spectrum analyzer, and an HP variable attenuator. All jamming equipment was located
in the Navigation/Controls Laboratory, Room 133 Building 640, Air Force Institute of
Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The Mathworks™ Software
MATLAB® version 5.2 was used on a Macintosh™ PowerPC® and a 400 MHz
Pentium® II PC platform for the analysis of data output by the XR5-M receivers and for
the preparation of the final thesis.

1.8 THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter 2 presents background information about the GPS signal, and an
analysis of interference to GPS receivers. Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of
the laboratory equipment setup of the two Navstar XR5-M receivers in the presence of
CW jamming signals. A detailed analysis of the test results is provided in Chapter 4
while Chapter 5 offers conclusions and recommendations for future research. Table 1.1
provides a synopsis of material included in Appendix A to T.
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Appendix A

1988 Doppier Survey of AFIT Building 640 Rooftop

Appendix B

Latitude/Longitude/Altitude to Earth Centered Earth Fixed (ECEF)
Coordinates Transformation

Appendix C

XR5-M Receiver Symbol Variables

Appendix D

XR5-M Receiver Technical Information

Appendix E

Hewlett Packard Equipment Description

Appendix F

MATLAB* Software Code

Appendix G

Sources of RF Interference and Mitigation Techniques

Appendix H

Summary of Lessons Learned

Appendix I-T

Figures for Results of Tests 1 to 12 (to be read in conjunction with the
analysis of results in Chapter 4)

Table 1.1 - Summary of Appendices
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//. GPS SIGNAL CHARACTERISTICS

2.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter provides background information about the GPS signal
characteristics, Doppler frequency offset and the development of GPS jamming
requirements. Twelve GPS jamming scenarios, provided in Chapter 3, were developed
to investigate RFI effects on the XR5-M receiver.

2.2 INITIAL SPREAD SPECTRUM FLUX DENSITY REQUIREMENTS
The basis for spread spectrum signals may be traced back to the original
requirements for the GPS signals. It was essential that the GPS signals, especially from
satellites at low elevation angles, would not interfere with land-based microwave
communications. Typically a microwave station relays a large number of 4 kHz voice
channels. Since GPS satellites can be seen low on the horizon it is likely that GPS
signals would be in the field of view of the microwave stations. The International
Telecommunication Union set the flux density for satellite-to-earth in the 1.525-2.500
GHz band for low elevation angles at a maximum of-154 dBw/m2 for any 4 kHz band
[PAR96]. This constraint is not on total radiated power but rather on power flux
spectral density. This led to the development of spread spectrum signals where the
signal is spread out over a wide bandwidth.
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2.3 GPS SIGNAL OVERVIEW
The GPS satellites transmit continuously on two frequencies. The carrier
frequencies are modulated with spread spectrum code with a unique pseudo-random
noise sequence for each satellite PRN code at a particular chipping rate. This signal is
also modulated with the 50 Hz navigation data message. One of the key differences
between the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) and GPS is that
GLONASS uses different frequencies (Frequency Division Multiple Access) but
transmits the same PRN code pair for each satellite. The GPS signal modulation is
based on each satellite using a different PRN code but with the same code chipping
rates and carrier frequencies. The GPS format is known as Code Division Multiple
Access (CDMA).
The GPS signal structure is Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum (DS/SS) which
spreads the signal energy over a wide bandwidth. The primary frequency, known as LI,
is at 1575.42 MHz. The coarse acquisition (C/A) code is a unique Gold code with a
period of 1023 chips and is transmitted at a rate of 1.023x106 chips per second (cps)
resulting in a code period of 1 millisecond (ms). The precision (P) code is transmitted
at a rate of 10.23xl06 cps and has a code period of one week.
Both the P and C/A code are published in ICD-GPS-200. The anti-spoof (AS)
mode of operation known as Y code is an encrypted version of the P code. Because
both the P code and Y code have the same chipping rate the acronym P(Y) code is
commonly used.
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Selective availability (SA) refers to the intentional degradation of the GPS
satellite signal either by a pseudo-random dither of the satellite GPS clock frequency, or
by incorporating small errors into the ephemeris information broadcast in the navigation
message. SA denies full position and velocity accuracy to unauthorized users.
Normally both AS and SA are enabled with exceptions occurring for testing purposes.
Differential techniques as discussed in Chapter 3 were used to eliminate SA effects
during data capture for this thesis research.
The combined power spectra of the C/A code and the P(Y) code are centered at
the LI frequency as shown in Figure 2.1. The first nulls of the C/A code are at +1.023
MHz from the center frequency and the first nulls of the P(Y) code power spectrum are
at ±10.23 MHz from the center frequency. The second frequency, L2, is centered at
1227.6 MHz. Normally, the L2 frequency is transmitted with P(Y) code power
spectrum plus the 50 Hz navigation data Phase Shift Keyed (PSK) modulated onto the
L2 carrier. The C/A code modulation is not normally transmitted on L2. This has been
the subject of much discussion lately as the US government has agreed to provide a
dedicated second civilian frequency at L2 starting with the first block IIF satellite
[DIV99]. The primary role of the second frequency is to allow corrections for
ionospheric errors. Additionally, a frequency of 1381.05 MHz, known as L3, is part of
the Nuclear Detection system carried on board the GPS satellites [PAR96].
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Figure 2.1 Combined Power Spectra of the C/A and P(Y) Code [AMD98]

2.4 SPECTRAL CHARACTERISTICS OF C/A CODE
The development of the equations for the GPS signal architecture and
interference signals were based on the work of Mr. Phillip Ward and Mr. A. J. Van
Dierendonck [KAP96, PAR96]. The physical application of the auto-correlation
function is used to achieve lock on the pseudo-random code. The auto-correlation
function of the GPS C/A code is

(=1023

1,0237^

where
Gift)
TCA

C/A code Gold code sequence as a function of time t for SV,
C/A code chipping period (977.5 nsec)
phase of the time shift in the auto-correlation function
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(2-1)

A special set of pseudo-range sequences with relatively low cross correlation
properties is used for the C/A codes, this set is known as the Gold codes. The autocorrelation function of the C/A code is a series of correlation triangles with a period of
1,023 C/A code chips (or 1 msec). This explains why the C/A codes do not have a
continuous power spectrum but instead have a 1000 Hz spaced line spectrum (separated
by the inverse of the code period) as shown in Figure 2.2.
For the C/A code, small correlations occur in the intervals between the
maximum correlation intervals. Fluctuations in the auto-correlation function results in a
deviation from the line spectrum of the expected sine (sin x/xf envelope. The ratio of
the power in each C/A line to the total power fluctuates (nearly 8 dB) with respect to the
-30 dB levels that would occur if every line contained the same power. Each of the C/A
codes has certain "strong" lines (above the sine envelope), an inherent weakness which
continuous wave (CW) interference at this line frequency can attack as shown in Figure
2.2. Normally the correlation process of a CW line and a PRN code will spread the CW
line, but the mixing process at certain "strong" C/A code line results in the RF
interference line being suppressed less than at other frequencies. The net result is that
CW energy can "leak" through the correlation process at this strong line [KAP96,
PAR96].

15 DEVELOPMENT OF INTERFERENCE SIGNAL CHARACTERISTICS
A variety of RF signals may be used to interfere with the GPS signals at a
receiver. Typically RF jamming can be of the form of CW, narrowband, and wideband
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electronic noise. Various forms of modulation of the carrier signal are available but the
CW signal is probably the simplest form of interference. The signal is concentrated in a
very narrow band around the LI or L2 frequencies. More sophisticated methods
involve the generation of replica PRN codes, and false data modulation.
The primary intent of jamming is to deny an adversary the use of the GPS
signals. Spoofing on the other hand is the deliberate attempt to mimic the GPS signals;
the results are incorrect position and velocity information. Effective spoofing could
prevent a solely GPS-based weapon system from achieving the correct target location.
The most challenging demands of spoofing require the target vehicle to be tracked with
a radar or laser. Once the vehicle's track is determined, false signals can be generated
which initially look very similar to the actual satellite's signals. Over a period of time
the signals are modified such that the position and velocity is "walked-off' from the
correct values.
The effects of ground based jamming and spoofing can be reduced by
employing a directional antenna which can be nulled either from jamming sources, or
optimized for the direction of actual satellite vehicles. Historically these types of
antenna systems are larger, heavier, more complex, and more expensive. Other
techniques apply pre-correlation and post-correlation signal processing techniques.
Methods of reducing RFI to GPS receivers are discussed in further detail in
Appendix G.
Signals which are received from satellites at low elevation angles are inherently
more vulnerable to jamming. A simple method of RFI rejection may be to increase the
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elevation mask angle for satellites low on the horizon. This technique was investigated
in Test 8 of this thesis and the results are discussed in Section 4.6.6.
The GPS signal powers are specified in ICD-GPS 200 and are based on the use
of a standard linearly polarized antenna. The minimum received power is specified at
LI for the C/A code as -160 dBw, for the LI P(Y) code as -163 dBw, and for the L2
P(Y) code as -166 dBw. These figures should be adjusted by approximately 0.4 dB
since GPS uses right hand circularly polarized (RHCP) antenna. As a result the
minimum received power specified at a RHCP antenna for LI C/A code is -159.6 dBw.
In actual practice the power of the satellite signals are designed such that they will
continue to meet power specifications at the satellite end-of-life. As a result newer
satellites tend to output signals which may be up to 6 dB stronger than the -159.6 dBw
specification. Variations in the satellite antenna gain, the receiver antenna gain, and
atmospheric losses also impact the received signal power which enters the receiver
[KAP96].
The development of the GPS interference signal characteristics was based on the
work of Mr. AJ. Van Dierendonck [PAR96]. An interference signal spread by a PRN
code produces noise that affects the effective signal-to-noise density S/N0, in ratio-Hz,

1

\NoJ

' s v1 + f

{NOIJ

N0T)
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(2-2)

where NOT is the spread thermal noise density and Noi is the spread interference noise
density. The convolution of the spectral density of the code and the interference
spectral density is the density of the noise or interference at the output of the correlator.

Na{f')=^Sc{f%{f'-fW

(2-3)

where Sc(f) is the spectral density of the reference PRN code and Sjff) is the density of
the interference or noise. The reference C/A code has a discrete spectral density that
may be described as follows:

(2-4)
Sc(fh I^CjSif-1000j)

where c, are spectral line coefficients, 8(f) is the dirac delta function, and the c, vary
about the envelope

sin2(i0007r/£/a)

(2-5)

where Tda is [1/1.023 x 106] s. The spectral density of the reference PRN code has the
property that
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J —o°

Continuous wave interference has the following spectral density:

W)=W-//)

(2-7)

where// is the frequency of the interference and Pi is the total interference power. For
C/A code the post correlation noise density can take on the value of one of the spectral
lines times the interference power, if centered on the spectral line. The resulting
spectral density is a spectral line because the spreading would repeat every C/A code
period.

Naß;)-Pfr8(fj-Ji)

(2 8)

"

Equation (2-8) is valid if the spectral density is computed over a relatively long period
of time and assumes that no data is modulated on the processed signal's C/A code.
Also, for relatively wide-band interference signals, the equations are valid since the
resulting spread interference becomes noise, with a code bandwidth that is statistically
independent over time. Furthermore, CW interference spread with the C/A code is not
statistically independent over time. Since the signal code is modulated with the 50 Hz
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data, the resulting spectral density components of interference can be computed only
with a minimum bandwidth of 50 Hz. As a result the spectral density components of
the CW interference are not exactly a line but rather a spread spectrum with a minimum
bandwidth equal to the post-correlation receiver-processing bandwidth. Even though
CW interference may not coincide with a C/A code spectral line, the interference will
pass through the correlation process but with a reduced effect. Because of this it is very
challenging to predict the effects of CW interference on the C/A code and normally the
worst case effects are used. These effects are based on equation (2-8) for the largest
C/A code spectral lines that can be roughly 9 dB larger than that of the Cj envelope
[PAR96].

2.6 RECEIVER TRACKING LOOPS
The acquisition and tracking of the GPS signal is a two-dimensional process.
Each tracking channel must track both the PRN code and the carrier phase/frequency
with a Doppler offset for each satellite. It does this by generating a replica code and
carrier signal as shown in Figure 2.3.
The code tracking is typically done in a Delay Lock Loop (DLL). A replica of
the PRN code is generated within the receiver, and then shifted until it correlates with
the satellite PRN code. The carrier tracking loop may be of the form of a Phase Lock
Loop (PLL), a Costas PLL, or a Frequency Lock Loop (FLL). Factors such as
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pre-detection integration time (PIT), carrier loop filter noise bandwidth, and dynamic
stress affect the overall performance of the tracking loop. A Costas carrier tracking
loop is commonly used in GPS receivers because Costas loops are insensitive to 180
degree phase reversals in the I and Q signals provided that the PIT of the I and Q signals
do not straddle the data bit transitions [KAP96].
The acquisition threshold for a receiver is higher than the tracking threshold.
Therefore, when RF interference reduces the C/N0 of all GPS signals below the
receiver's thresholds, the receiver will lose its ability to generate a valid navigation
solution. In the case of CW interference it is feasible that the carrier tracking loop may
actually lock on to the jamming signal as shown in Section 4.6. Navigation solution
problems will occur due to incorrect signal phase and data bit synchronization.

2. 7DOPPLER SHIFT
The magnitude of Doppler shift varies depending on the relative velocity of the
receiver and the satellites. A satellite at zenith is at the closest point of approach and
has no radial velocity resulting in no Doppler shift. The maximum radial velocity of a
satellite occurs at the horizon and is either positive or negative resulting in maximum
Doppler shift of approximately ±6 KHz. Frequency error and drift of satellite and user
clocks also affects the Doppler shift measurement [PAR96].
The GPS receiver must account for the Doppler shift relative to the receiver's
local oscillator. A numerically controlled oscillator (NCO) is used in a GPS receiver to
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control the carrier tracking loop. The observed frequency shift of the received signal
from the NCO is a measure of the Doppler shift [PAR96].
Different Doppler frequencies for each satellite provide an opportunity to target
particular satellites for being jammed at the receiver. Because GPS orbits have
repeating ground tracks, Doppler frequencies can be predicted for each satellite based
on satellite ephemeris data and a given user location. An adjustment is required due to
the approximate four minute difference in a solar day and sidereal day. These Doppler
characteristics were used to investigate the feasibility of selectively jamming a specific
satellite PRN signal, as highlighted in Section 4.6.

2.8 ONoAND J/S CALCULATIONS
The Signal to Noise ratio or C/N is commonly used as a measure of a receiver's
tracking threshold. Noise power is spread over a wide bandwidth while the GPS
satellite signal of interest is spread over a narrow bandwidth. Filters in the receiver are
used to narrow the signal bandwidth of interest in order to receive the minimum amount
of noise and at the same time the maximum amount of signal. The term, C/N0> is the
carrier to noise power ratio in a 1 Hz bandwidth (dB-Hz). The derivations in this
section are taken from Mr. Ward's work presented in [KAP96], [WAR95], and
[WAR98].
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The equation for un-jammed C/N0 at base-band is given by the equation:

JV„

= Sr + Ga -10 log(kT0)- Nf-L (dB-Hz)

(2-9)

where:
Sr
Ga
101og(kTo)
k
To

Nf
(dB)
L
C
No

received GPS signal power (dBw)
antenna gain toward the satellite (dBic)
thermal noise density (dBw-Hz) = -204 dBw-Hz
Boltzman's Constant (watts-seconds/K) = 1.38 x 10'23
thermal noise reference temperature (K)
290 K
noise figure of receiver including antenna and cable losses
implementation losses plus A/D converter losses (dB)
Total received Signal Power
Noise Power Density of the system

As an example, using received satellite signal power, Sr = -159.6 dBw, an
antenna gain Ga = 0 dBic, a receiver noise figure, Nf = 4 dB, and implementation losses,
L = 2 dB, result in a C/N0 of 38.4 dB-Hz [KAP96].
In the presence of RF interference, the unjammed C/ND is reduced to an
equivalent carrier to noise density ratio. Normally the lower case terms, c/n0, are used
when the expression is a dimensionless ratio, and upper case is used when it is
expressed in dB-Hz. The equivalent (eqv) c/n0 provides the relationship between
unjammed c/n0 and the jamming to signal ratio as follows:
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(2-10)

c_
eqv

Us
+• ä
[c/nj Q*fc

(power ratio)

1

where:
unjammed carrier to noise power in a 1 Hz bandwidth (ratio)
jammer to signal power (ratio)
GPS PRN code chipping rate (chips/sec) = 1.023 x 10 for C/A code
spread spectrum processing gain adjustment factor
1.0 for narrowbandjammer
1.5 for spread spectrum (wideband jammer)
2.0 for wideband (Gaussian) jammer

c/n0
j/s
fc
Q

This equation may be written in terms of dB-Hz as follows:

c

C_

-10 log 10

(2-11)
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+

-ieqv

(dB)
Q*fc

where:
C/No =
J/S

=

unjammed carrier to noise power in a 1 Hz bandwidth (dB-Hz)
101og(c/no)
jammer to signal power ratio (dB)
101og(j/s)
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When expressed in terms of J/S, the equation becomes

r

r

(2-12)
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and substituting in values for Q=l (for narrowband jamming), fc =1.023 x 106 for C/A
code, optimistic values for a tracking threshold [C/N0]eqv of 28.0 dB-Hz and a typical
C/No of 38.4 dB-Hz results in a J/S of 31.7 dB.
Navstar, the manufacturer of the XR5-M, provided basic technical details of the
XR5-M receiver design which are included in Appendix D; however, typical ranges for
C/No from the XR5-M operating manual were reported as between 33 and 50 dB-Hz.
Finally, the J/S jammer to signal power ratio in dB may be written as

[|] = 7r-5^(dB)

(2-13)

where
Jr
Sr

received (incident) jammer power into the receiver (dBm)
received (incident) signal power into the receiver (dBm) [WAR95].
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2.9

PREVIOUS GPS MODELING AND SIMULATION AT AFIT
A brief synopsis is provided of previous AFIT thesis research into GPS receiver

design and/or digital filter designs. The research by Captain Vasquez, Captain Falen,
and Captain Harris provided beneficial background information.
Captain Juan Vasquez conducted research into failure detection and isolation
techniques using an extended Kaiman filter. Analysis was conducted using a Kaiman
filter development package known as the Multi-mode Simulation for Optimal Filter
Evaluation (MSOFE). Captain Vasquez' results indicated that "failures within the GPS
could be detected, isolated, and in some cases compensated through feedback"
[VAS92].
Captain Gerald Falen conducted thesis research in 1994 into the "Analysis and
Simulation of Rejection of Narrow-band GPS Jamming Using Digital Excision
Temporal Filtering (DETF)." The results of this research indicated that a DETF could
effectively reject all types of simulated jammers except for the wide-band noise
jammer. The simulation results indicated that the DETF actually degraded the GPS
system performance in the presence of a wide-band noise jammer [FAL94].
Captain George Harris conducted research into the performance of two types of
tracking loops used in GPS receivers. The Delay Lock Loop (DLL) and the Modified
Tanlock Loop were modeled both standalone, and combined. Individually the tracking
loop results highlighted tracking lock across a wide range of loop gains and signal to
noise ratios. When combined; however, the loops did not perform as well as theory
predicted [HAR93].
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2.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provided an overview of the signal characteristics of the Global
Positioning System and the development of GPS jamming requirements. Further details
regarding sources of RFI and means of mitigation of RFI are provided at Appendix G.
Based on the GPS signal characteristics discussed in Chapter 2, jamming scenarios were
developed in Chapter 3 and then applied to actual GPS signals.
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///. EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION AND TEST SET-UP
3.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter provides a description of the equipment test configuration used
during the course of the thesis research. Further discussion of the equipment's technical
characteristics, settings and software configuration are provided in Appendix D and E.
The equipment used in the research included two commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
Navstar XR5-M 12 channel GPS receivers, a Hewlett Packard (HP) signal generator, an
HP spectrum analyzer, and an HP variable attenuator.

3.2 DIFFERENTIAL GPS (DGPS)
A C/A Code receiver is susceptible to several sources of position errors
including Selective Availability (SA), ionospheric and tropospheric delays, space
perturbations, receiver noise and multipath. The overall error is typically 100 meter
2DRMS. These error sources make it difficult to ascertain whether observed position
errors are due to RF interference or due to other sources. By using DGPS, correlated
errors are removed which allows relative positioning within a few meters.
The base station used a fixed XR5-M GPS receiver, operating at a known,
surveyed location. It used the satellite signals to compute corrections which represented
the signal errors introduced by ionospheric propagation, SA etc. Because the base
station antenna was at a known surveyed location, the total of the measured errors in
each pseudorange were then sent via an RTCM link to the mobile receiver. The
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antennas had a very short baseline (4.70 meters) resulting in highly correlated errors.
The mobile receiver then determined position to DGPS accuracy. In the case of this
research the two XR5-M RTCM data link ports were connected directly via a cable.
The XR5-M with firmware version 3.7 uses RTCM output messages for
reported accuracy better than 3 meters circular error probable (CEP) [NAV96]. Realtime position with sub-meter accuracy using RTCM 20 & 21 message types would be
feasible with a firmware/software upgrade to the latest version to the XR5-M although
this was not considered necessary for this research. The upgrade would have provided
the capability to obtain more accurate measurements and any individuals interested in
conducting future research may wish to pursue the upgrade.
The base station antenna location was located within 8.20 meters of the "ALGN
MARK" position based on the 1988 survey (Appendix A and B). The three 1988
surveyed locations on AFIT rooftop were "Doppler Station 32058," "ALGN MARK,"
and "GPS Antenna Mark (Bolt)." For the purpose of this research, the relative position
between antenna was of greater interest and as such the position of the previously
surveyed alignment mark "ALGN MARK" was used for the Base station coordinates.
No corrections were applied to this error since the receivers were used in a relative
differential GPS configuration. The distance between the base station antenna and the
mobile antenna was measured as 4.70 meters. The actual position of the mobile antenna
was corrected to the base station position in post processing. The remaining position
error measured by the mobile receiver was a result of receiver noise, multipath and
errors caused by RF interference to the mobile receiver.
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An option of using a single GPS antenna with the two receivers was considered,
but there were several unknowns, and thus this option was not selected. There was
concern that impedance mismatch and damage to the antenna pre-amplifier could result.
The two main benefits of this option are that the multipath error would be common to
both receivers and thus could be eliminated easily, and no post processing correction
would be required for distances between the base station antenna and the mobile
antenna. Should the option of a single antenna with a pre-amplifier driven by two
receivers prove feasible, it would be the recommended configuration for this sort of
testing in the future. The use of an electrical component to block the DC power signal
on one of the receiver cables to the antenna may prevent antenna pre-amplifier damage.
This may allow a suitable configuration where only one of the receivers drives the
antenna pre-amplifier.

3.3 RTCMMESSAGE FORMATS
The XR5-M receiver uses RTCM Type 1, 2, 3 and 9 messages in the differential
corrections sent through the RTCM port. The RTCM Type 1 messages contain
pseudorange and range-rate correction only, consequently the accuracy achievable is
approximately 3 meters. Type 1 messages can accommodate up to 12 pseudorange
corrections whereas Type 9 messages are similar in format but restricted to a maximum
of three pseudorange corrections per message. RTCM Type 2 messages contain deltapseudorange corrections, transmitted for a period of approximately 5 minutes following
a satellite ephemeris upload. If selected these corrections enable more accurate
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positions to be determined during the ephemeris transition. Finally, RTCM Type 3
messages contain the co-ordinates of the base station transmitted twice an hour at 15
and 45 minutes past the hour [NAV96].

3.4

EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION
The main hardware components used during this research were two COTS

Navstar XR5-M 12 Channel GPS Receivers used in conjunction with Navstar software
version 3.7. The XR5-M has a volt rating of 11-32 volt DC, and is suitable for nominal
12, 24, or 28 volt systems. The unit is also reverse voltage protected. The red and
white leads were connected to the positive supply, the black lead to the negative supply,
and the green lead to ground for screening [NAV96]. A screened data cable was
grounded at the XR5-M connector end to minimize interference. Power connection
wiring was as short as practicable, and not shared with heavy current and intermittent
devices.
The face of the XR5-M receiver is shown in Figure 3.1 and highlights the
receiver ports. The computer display unit (CDU) and RTCM Ports are bi-directional
RS232D for control and data interchange. The RTCM port was used for the transfer of
differential corrections. The RECORDER port is RS422A (compatible with the NMEA
function) and normally operates as an output only. The recorder port may be used to
log data on to a PC or other peripheral device; however, it was not used during the
thesis research. Instead, data were recorded using the XR5-M CDU port connected to
the PC COM1 port and using the XR5-M data monitor software program [NAV96].
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Figure 3.1- XR5-M Receiver [NAV96]
Two Navstar GPS volute antennas with built in pre-amplifiers were located on
the AFIT Building 640 rooftop. Each antenna was affixed to an individual bracket that
was in turn anchored to a 1.25 inch diameter pipe using a U-bolt and then secured to
existing AFIT rooftop structure. In order to reduce the effects of multipath, a choke
ring antenna would have been preferred for the DGPS application.
A Hewlett Packard (HP) HP8643A 0.26-2060 MHz Signal Generator was used
to generate CW and swept CW signals as specified for the Test 1 to 12 scenarios
developed in Section 3.6. An HP Variable Attenuator Model Number 394A was used to
vary the signal level output by the Signal Generator. An HP Spectrum Analyzer
HP8563 A was used to measure the jamming signal characteristics. Both the HP signal
generator and spectrum analyzer were programmed to match the individual test scenario
configurations to expedite the switching between settings within each test. This was
especially beneficial during the swept CW tests.
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Cable and connector losses were measured at the LI frequency using the signal
generator and spectrum analyzer. The losses were then applied to the actual jamming
signals for each of the jamming scenarios presented in Section 3.6.
Both receivers were connected to 80486 PCs and communication was via the
Navstar XR5-M software running under MSDOS. The PC (CDU) was used to control
the receiver initialization, configuration and for capturing GPS data (the data was saved
in an ASCII format).
The Data Monitor software, provided with the XR5-M, was used to generate a
specific set of variables that could then be captured to a data file. The data files were
then edited using a text editor to strip off the header and footer text from the files,
leaving just the data. The Mathworks™ Software MATLAB® version 5.2 was used on
a Macintosh™ PowerPC® and a 400 MHz Pentium® II PC platform for the loading and
analysis of the data files. The data files varied in size between 3.3 and 17.4 Megabytes
depending on the number of variables captured, the total sample time and the data
sample rate. Figure 3.2 highlights the equipment as configured for Tests 1 to 12 in
Section 3.6

3.5 MEASUREMENT OF GPS AND JAMMING SIGNALS
One of the challenges of determining J/S is the magnitude of signal levels
involved. As has been discussed, several factors impact on actual measured received
signal values. Variations in the output power by different satellites due to age, satellite
antenna gain pattern, the receiver antenna gain pattern, and atmospheric losses all
3-6

Antenna

HP
SIGNAL
GENERATOR

Antenna

Splitter

V

HP
SPECTRUM
ANALYZER
Combiner

HP
VARIABLE
ATTENUATOR

XR5-M
BASE
STATION

XR5-M
MOBILE.
RECEIVER

PC

PC
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impact the actual received signal power. For this thesis research actual live GPS signals
were used. If a GPS simulator was used, the signals must output correct signal levels by
adjusting for system losses and gains.
If one simply connects a spectrum analyzer to measure the GPS signals, only
noise will be observed since the strength of GPS signals at the analyzer are below the
noise threshold. As a result there is no immediate means of measuring received satellite
signal power. As an alternative, values for C/N0 may be captured for all receiver
tracking channels, (an XR5-M for this research). A general sense of the relative
received signal levels may be observed between receiver channels.
For the purpose of this thesis the received signal power was considered to meet
the GPS specifications of at least -129.6 dBm (-159.6 dBW) incident power received at
the GPS antenna. The receiver antenna/pre-amplifier gain was taken from manufacturer
specifications as 20 dB [NAV96]. Cable and connector losses were measured at LI for
both jamming and received signals.
The CW jamming signal was measured prior to entering a variable attenuator.
This equipment setup was required because the CW jamming output of the variable
attenuator was near the noise floor of the spectrum analyzer.
Jamming and the GPS signal measurement errors combine into an overall J/S
amplitude error during testing. The focus of this thesis was on the ability to selectively
jam satellite signals at the receiver, for the relative differences between low and high
jamming levels, and the differences in position error for CW and swept CW jamming.
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Based on the results of Equation 2-12, J/S ratios between 20.7 and 45.7 dB were
investigated during preliminary testing to validate receiver thresholds.

3.6 JAMMING SCENARIOS
This section describes the twelve tests that were developed based on the GPS
signal characteristics from Chapter 2. Elevation mask angle was set to five degrees for
all tests with the exception of Test 8 (elevation mask angle of 25 degrees). Baseline
performance of the XR5-M receiver with no jamming was investigated in Tests 1 and 2
as highlighted in Table 3.1. Each sample consisted of a subset of the variables outlined
in Appendix C.
Test Number (Date)
l(20Nov98)
2 (30 Nov 98)

Jamming Parameters
No Jamming
Sample Rate:(one sample per 5 seconds)
Test Duration: 1555Z-2002Z
No Jamming
Sample Rate:(one sample per second)
Test Duration: 1500Z-1730Z

Table 3.1 - No Jamming Tests

The two primary forms of jamming used were CW and swept CW. J/S levels
were set between 20.7 and 40.7 dB and the center frequency was normally set near LI.
Parameters for CW jamming included center frequency and jamming power level. The
XR5-M receiver was subjected to CW jamming as outlined in Tests 3-8 as shown in
Table 3.2.
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Test Number (Date)
3 (16 Nov 98)

4(27Nov98)

5(2Dec98)

6 (3 Dec 98)

7 (8 Dec 98)

8 (11 Dec 98)

Jamming Parameters
Center Frequency (MHz):1575.420010
J/S (dB): 20.7
Sample Rate: One sample per 5 seconds
Test Duration: 1603Z-2007Z
Center Frequency (MHz): 1575.419305
J/S (dB): 35.7
Sample Rate: One sample per second
Jam Target: PRN# 15, 29
Test Duration: 1554Z-1700Z
Center Frequency (MHz): 1575.421960
J/S (dB): 35.7
Sample Rate: One sample per second
Jam Target: PRN# 25, 29, 30
Test Duration: 1500Z-1730Z
Center Frequency (MHz): 1575.482950
J/S (dB): 25.7
Sample Rate: One sample per second
Jam Target: PRN # 29,30 at lower level
Test Duration: 1500Z-1730Z
Center Frequency (MHz): 1575.420010
J/S (dB): 20.7, 25.7, 30.7, 35.7
Sample Rate: One sample per second
Test Duration: 1500Z-1710Z
Center Frequency (MHz): 1575.419930
J/S (dB): 20.7, 25.7, 30.7, 35.7
Elevation Mask Angle Raised to 25 Degrees
Sample Rate: One sample per second
Test Duration: 1510Z-1710Z

Table 3.2 - CW Jamming Tests

For swept CW jamming, the center frequency was centered on the sweep
bandwidth over the sweep duration. The swept CW jamming parameters included
center frequency and power level, sweep bandwidth and sweep duration. Dedicated
swept CW jamming was conducted in Test 9, 10 and 11 as highlighted in Table 3.3.
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Test Number (Date)
9 (6 Dec 98)

10 (7 Dec 98)

11 (10 Dec 98)

Jamming Parameters
Center Frequency (MHz): 1575.419950
J/S (dB): 20.7, 25.7, 30.7, 35.7, 40.7
Sweep Bandwidth: 2 MHz, 200 kHz, 20 kHz
Sweep Duration: 20 seconds
Sample Rate: One sample per second
Test Duration: 1500Z-1700Z
Center Frequency (MHz): 1575.419950
J/S (dB): 20.7, 25.7, 30.7, 35.7, 40.7
Sweep Bandwidth: 20 kHz, 10 kHz
Sweep Duration: 20 seconds
Sample Rate: One sample per second
Test Duration: 1500Z-1710Z
Center Frequency (MHz): 1575.419950
J/S (dB): 20.7, 25.7, 30.7, 35.7
Sweep Bandwidth: 2 MHz, 200 kHz, 20 kHz
Sweep Duration: 1 seconds
Sample Rate: One sample per second
Test Duration: 1500Z-1710Z

Table 3.3 Swept CW Jamming Tests

Finally Test 12 was dedicated to investigating position error as a result of CW
jamming as shown in Table 3.4

Test Number (Date)
12 (17 Dec 98)

Jamming Parameters
Center Frequency (MHz): 1575.419935
J/S (dB): 35.7
Sample Rate: One sample per second
Jamming Periods -10 minutes
No Jamming Periods - 5 minutes
Test Duration: 1430Z-1705Z

Table 3.4 - CW Jamming Position Error Measurements
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3.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provided an overview of the equipment configuration used for
jamming GPS signals in this thesis research. Further details of the equipment are
contained in Appendix D and Appendix E. The jamming scenarios in Table 3.1,3.2,
3.3 and 3.4 were used for Tests 1 to 12. Results for Tests 1 to 12 are discussed in
Chapter 4 and the associated plots are contained in Appendix I to Appendix T.
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW
Although each GPS satellite transmits at the same LI frequency, the relative
motion between each satellite and the receiver causes the Doppler shifted frequency to
be different for each satellite. In addition, each satellite transmits a different PRN code.
These two characteristics make each GPS satellite signal received unique and it was
these characteristics that were used to investigate the feasibility of selectively jamming
a GPS satellite.
In order to develop an appreciation for the various effects of CW and swept CW
jamming on the XR5-M receiver, preliminary testing was conducted 6-15 November
1998. This chapter presents the experimental results and an analysis of the results for
the data gathered between 16 November and 17 December 1998 based on the twelve
tests developed in Chapter 3. Figures for Tests 1 to Test 12 are provided in Appendix I
to Appendix T respectively.

4.2 EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION
The equipment was configured as shown in Chapter 3, Figure 3.2, using two
Navstar XR5-M GPS receivers, a Hewlett Packard (HP) HP 8643 A Signal Generator,
an HP8563 A Spectrum Analyzer, and an HP Variable Attenuator Model Number 394A.
One of the XR5-M receivers was used as a base station and transmitted differential
corrections directly to the second XR5-M receiver operating as a mobile receiver. The
HP Signal Generator was used to generate CW and swept CW signals and the HP
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Variable Attenuator was used to set various jamming levels. Further details of the
XR5-M receivers are provided in Appendix D, and details of the HP equipment are
provided in Appendix E.

4.3 JAM TO SIGNAL MEASUREMENTS
The specified LI C/A signal level received from the satellites was -160 dBW.
This value was adjusted according to Mr. P. Ward [KAP96] for the differences in
antenna polarization to -159.6 dBW (-129.6 dBm). Using measured cable/connector
losses between the antenna and the receiver of 16.3 dB, and a specified antenna gain of
20 dB resulted in an overall LI C/A code signal level at the receiver of-125.9 dBm.
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the actual J/S for the output of the signal generator,
the given attenuator settings, and the total cable/connector losses measured at LI
between the signal generator and the receiver.

Signal
Generator
Output
(dBm)

-10
-10
-10
-10
-10
-10

Cable/Connector Attenuator
Setting
Losses Measured
(dB)
between Signal
Generator and
Receiver
(dB)
120
10.2
85
10.2
80
10.2
75
10.2
70
10.2
65
10.2

Jamming
Signal Level
Measured at
Receiver
(dBm)

LlC/A
Signal
Level
at Receiver
(dBm)

J/S
(dB)

-140.2
-105.2
-100.2
-95.2
-90.2
-85.2

-125.9
-125.9
-125.9
-125.9
-125.9
-125.9

-14.3
20.7
25.7
30.7
35.7
40.7

Table 4.1 - J/S Calculations
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4.4 TEST RESULTS OVERVIEW
Jamming and no jamming tests were conducted over the period 6 November to
17 December 1998. A sub-set of the overall results is provided in this thesis which
highlights the observations over the testing period. Test dates for Test 1 to Test 12 were
not sequential. For example Test 3 was conducted 16 November 1998 while Test 1 and
Test 2 were conducted 20 and 30 November 1998 respectively. Test periods were
generally scheduled to look at a common set of satellites from test to test. A summary
of the test parameters is provided in Table 4.2.
The results of Test 1 to Test 12 are discussed below and are plotted in Appendix
I to Appendix T. The first two pages of Appendix I to T indicate the GPS satellite
constellation configuration at specific times. A sample plot is shown below in Figure
4.1.

GPS Satellite Visibility
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\
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Mask Angle:
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Figure 4.1 - Satellite Constellation 1555Z 20 Nov 98
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CENTER
FREQ
OFFSET
FROMLl
(APPROX)
(HZ)
NO JAM

TOTAL
FREQ
SPAN
(KHZ)

SWEEP
RATE
(SECS)

JAMMING
LEVELS
(J/S dB)

AIM

N/A

+10

N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

EST. BASELINE
EST. BASELINE
INVESTIGATE
LOW J/S

L

-694

N/A

N/A

02/12/98

M

-42

N/A

N/A

6

03/12/98

N

+ 62942

N/A

N/A

N/A
N/A
JAM ON AT
MINUTE 2
AT 20.7
30.7 FOR
FIRST SIX
MINUTES,
THEN NO
JAM UNTIL
MINUTE 24
WHEN
LEVEL
WAS SET
AT 35.7
JAM ON AT
MINUTE 80
AT 35.7
JAM ON AT
MINUTE 75
AT 25.7

7

08/12/98

O

+6

N/A

N/A

20.7,25.7,
30.7,35.7

8

11/12/98

P

-70

N/A

N/A

20.7,25.7,
30.7,35.7

9

06/12/98

Q

-60

2000,200,20

20

20.7,25.7,
30.7,35.7,
40.7

10

07/12/98

R

-60

20,10

20

11

10/12/98

S

-50

2000,200,20

1

12

17/12/98

T

-63

N/A

N/A

20.7,25.7,
30.7,35.7
20.7,25.7,
30.7,35.7,
40.7
35.7

DATE

APDX.

1
2
3

20/11/98
30/11/98
16/11/98

I
J
K

4

27/11/98

5

TEST

#

Table 4.2 - Summary of Test Parameters
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ATTEMPT TO
JAMPRN15
AND PRN 29

ATTEMPT TO
JAM PRN 30
AND PRN 29
ATTEMPT TO
JAM PRN 30
USING MAX
SPECTRAL
LINE AT
RELATIVELY
LOW J/S
INVESTIGATE
IMPACT OF
VARIOUS J/S
LEVELS
REDUCE
IMPACT OF
JAMMING BY
RAISING
ELEVATION
MASK ANGLE
TO 25
DEGREES
INVESTIGATE
IMPACT OF
SWEPT CW
FORGIVEN
PARAMETERS
AS ABOVE
AS ABOVE

INVESTIGATE
POSITION
ERRORS

The vectors in the polar plots of Figure 4.1 indicate the direction of satellite
travel as observed from the GPS antenna location on AFIT Building 640 rooftop. The
PRN code for each satellite is labeled on the tail of each vector for current time with the
head of the vector indicating future direction of travel. The times for the polar plots are
for current local date and GPS (UTC) time (in 12 hour format). Current almanac data
was downloaded to a Garmin™ 12XL handheld GPS receiver and then downloaded to a
Macintosh™ PowerPC®. The polar plots were generated using "MacGPS PRo® version
2.5.6" Software from James Associates™. Polar plots were also generated from the
XR5-M ephemeris data in MATLAB® and were compared with the Garmin

/

Macintosh™ plots. The differences between ephemeris data and almanac data were not
noticeable for the scale of plots used.
Unlike many twelve channel receivers in production today, the XR5-M receiver
(using software version 3.7) selects only five satellites for the navigation solution. The
five satellites chosen offers the lowest GDOP. The combination of five satellites used
in the navigation solution is offered in the third figure for Appendix I to Appendix T, an
example is shown in Figure 4.2.
The fourth figure in Appendix I to Appendix T indicates the PRN number
assigned to each of the receiver tracking channels as shown in Figure 4.3. Typically
Channel 11 was idle for most tests.
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Figure 4.3 - PRN # Assigned to Each Tracking Channel versus Time
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An example of the fifth figure in Appendix I to Appendix T, highlighting the
GDOP values for the given navigation solution is shown in Figure 4.4. The reader
should note that the scale for the vertical axis for each of the "double" GDOP plots was
set to maximize the display, as a result, the scale for the two plots is normally different.
During later jamming tests, the change in scale is of a larger magnitude than for Tests 1
and 2.
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Figure 4.4 - GDOP versus Time
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240

260

The remaining figures in Appendix I to T, show the Doppler frequency offset for
each of the channels, the X,Y,Z and 3D ECEF position error of the mobile receiver
antenna as compared to the base station, the receiver clock bias and drift, and finally the
C/N0 plots for each of the tracking channels. Examples of these plots are shown in
Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 respectively.
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Figure 4.5 - Doppler frequency offset versus Time
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Figure 4.7 - XR5-M Receiver Clock Bias and Drift versus Time
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Figure 4.8 - C/N0 versus Time
For the Doppler frequency offset plots, the associated PRN number for each of
the tracking channels has been extracted from the combination of the channel number
and the fourth figures of Appendix I to T in order to label each of the tracking channels
with actual PRN numbers. It is still necessary to refer back to the third figure of
Appendix I to T to match tracking channel number with PRN number for C/N0 plots.
For Test 9, 10,11, and 12 an additional plot of J/S versus time is provided in Appendix
Q, R, S and T respectively.
The elevation mask angle was set to 5 degrees for all tests with the exception of
Test 8 where a receiver elevation mask angle of 25 degrees was used. The purpose of
this change was to investigate the increase in elevation angle as a means to reduce the
CW jamming effects on low elevation satellites.
4-10

4.5 NO JAMMING TEST RESULTS
This section discusses the results of Test 1 and Test 2 and the respective figures
are contained in Appendix I and J.

4.5.1 TEST1 RESULTS (FIGURES CONTAINED LN APPENDIX 1)
Test 1 results for the data collected at a five second sample rate between 1555Z
and 2001Z on 20 November 1998 under a no jamming scenario were analyzed and
discussed below. A general sense of the receiver operation can be gathered from the
polar plots of the satellite constellation in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 and the PRN number used
in the navigation solution in Figure 1.3. PRN 22 and 25 are shown at relatively high
elevation angles and were used in conjunction with other satellites such as PRN 1, 5,15
and 21. GDOP values from Figure 1.5 typically ranged between 2 and 4 with a few
exceptions, note the different scales on the vertical axis.
Although the XR5-M is a 12 channel receiver; software version 3.7 (which was
used for the tests conducted in this research) used only five channels for calculating
navigational information. It was also observed that channel 12 of the receiver tracks the
same satellite as channel 1 of the receiver (provided channel 1 has lock on a valid
satellite). Channel 12 is presumably used to measure receiver inter-channel biases by
comparing the same satellite being tracked on channel 1 of the receiver. Generally, the
receiver assigns satellites in view sequentially to each of the receiver tracking channels
(Test 12 is a notable exception as discussed in Section 4.8.1). Each of the satellite
PRNs assigned to each tracking channel is plotted in Figure 1.4 in Appendix I. For
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example, as shown in Figure 1.4, the receiver tracking channels assigned at the
beginning of the run are shown in Table 4.3.
Receiver Tracking Channel
land 12

PRN Number
1

15
21
23

25
29
30

10
11

0 (channel idle)

Table 4.3 - PRN Number Assigned to Receiver Tracking Channel

The assignment of a PRN to a particular tracking channel does not mean that the
receiver is actually tracking that PRN. Plots of C/N„, as shown in Figures 1.13 to 1.18,
provide a clear indication of the tracking status of each channel. A separate XR5-M
variable indicating the status of each tracking channel was collected as a cross check to
C/No (Appendix C) but was considered redundant and therefore was not plotted. It is
important to understand the relationship between the PRN number assigned to each
tracking channel when analyzing the C/N0 plots. Plots of C/N0 are by channel number;
as a result dramatic changes in C/N0 values need to be cross-checked with the PRN
assigned to each tracking channel. For example, the C/N0 value may indicate going to a
zero value upon losing lock and then it either may regain lock or it may switch to a new
PRN. This is shown in Figure 1.4 which indicates that channel 2 is tracking PRN 5 at
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minute 103, from Figure 1.13 channel 2 loses lock intermittently on PRN 5 and then
shortly thereafter loses lock completely. At minute 140 channel 2 switches to tracking
PRN 6 which is shown in Figures 1.4 and 1.13.
The three dimensional instantaneous position error was determined by taking the
magnitude of the error vector in three dimensions. The mean of the overall error in
each of the X, Y and Z directions was of both positive and negative values. For
example assume two samples are taken; the first sample has an X, Y, Z measurement
error of 2, -2, and 3 meters and the second sample has an error of-2, 2, and -3
respectively. Based on these two samples the mean in each of the X, Y, and Z direction
would be zero. The magnitude of the error in three dimensions was calculated by
taking the square root of the some of the squares for each sample. In this case, the
magnitude of the error would be the root of 17, ie. 4.1 meters for both samples. The
mean of these two 3D errors would be 4.1 meters. This technique was used because the
focus of measurement error was on the instantaneous 3D error during jamming
windows. Mean errors were taken as a check on the differentially corrected outputs
during no jamming windows.
The overall position error in the ECEF coordinate system had a mean of-0.365
meters in the X direction, 0.0937 meters in the Y direction and -0.757 meters in the Z
direction. The 3D position error was calculated to have a mean of 6.923 meters and a
standard deviation of 4.293 meters. This position error was reasonable given the
anticipated three meters CEP from the receiver specifications. There was likely a small
error attributed to the base station location not being surveyed to the one meter
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accuracy specified even though relative position error was the main error of interest
[NAV96].
In DGPS mode multipath errors are normally the largest source of error and the
use of two volute antenna would have contributed to this error. The volute antenna is
designed for maritime use, ie. a rolling/pitching platform. As a result, the antenna
maintains a reasonable gain at low elevation angles making it more susceptible to
multipath effects. For the purpose of this thesis, the measured ECEF position error was
acceptable. Further information on ECEF calculations is provided in Appendix B.
The magnitude of position error is also related to the correlation between
increases in position error and increases in GDOP. For example, at minute 82 in Figure
1.5 an increase in GDOP occurs, the associated increase in 3D position error above 30
meters is evident in Figure 1.11.
Figures 1.6 to 1.9 provide insight into the actual Doppler frequency offset from
the LI carrier for each of the tracking channels. The LI frequency is mixed in the
receiver and reduced from RF to intermediate frequency (IF). During the first five
minutes of Figure 1.6 a wide swath is observed. A detailed look at the swath in Figure
1.7 revealed that PRN 5 was in a search mode and finally gains lock at minute 8.
Since the two receivers were operated in a relative differential mode using
separate antennas, the receivers were susceptible to different multipath effects.
Excellent examples of multipath effects on PRN 14 were observed over the entire six
week testing period for an azimuth of 318 degrees and an elevation angle of 8 degrees.
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At minute 65 the spike in Doppler frequency on PRN 14 is evident in Figure 1.8. Loss
of lock by PRN 8 at minute 94 and PRN 5 at minute 103 is also shown in Figure 1.8.
The C/No for PRN 1, which was tracked by channel 1 and channel 12 (Figure
1.4), appear nearly identical (Figure 1.13 channel 1 and Figure 1.18 channel 12). By
expanding both of these plots to extreme levels, small differences could be seen
between the two channels. For the purpose of this thesis, no further research was
conducted comparing these two sets of values. It is believed that these differences are
used to measure inter-channel biases. Channel 11 was idle throughout the period.
For most PRNs observed, once the receiver began tracking the satellite, the
Doppler frequency offset was a positive value and reduced as the satellite approached
the observer location. As the satellite moved away from the observer it demonstrated a
negative Doppler frequency offset which increased in the negative direction. Note that
although the Doppler frequency has a larger magnitude at lower elevation angles, the
rate of change of Doppler frequency is smaller at lower elevation angles. Because of
this, CW jamming signals will dwell for a longer period of time at the tracking loop
bandwidths as the frequency of the tracking channels for low elevation satellites moves
through the spectral 1000 Hz jamming frequencies. In Figure 1.9 an interesting
characteristic of PRN 3 was observed. The positive Doppler frequency offset actually
increased in the positive direction for a period of approximately 30 minutes before the
Doppler frequency offset finally started to decrease.
Note also that channel 7 was assigned to PRN 23 and switched to tracking PRN
22 at minute 95 as shown in Figures 1.4,1.8, and 1.16 (channel 7). At minute 225
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Channel 5 switches from PRN 15 to PRN 3 and channel 6 switches from PRN 21 to
PRN 18 and as shown in Figures 1.4,1.9, and 1.15 (channel 5 and channel 6).
From Figures 1.6,1.8 and 1.9 it can be seen that there are occasions when two
satellite PRN numbers have the same Doppler frequency offset. For example, PRN 15
and PRN 29 have a Doppler frequency offset of-617 Hz at minute 54 (1649Z). PRN 30
and PRN 29 have a Doppler frequency offset of-970 Hz at minute 76.5 (1711.5Z).
PRN 1 and PRN 15 have a Doppler frequency offset of-2031 Hz at minute 90.1
(1725.1Z) and PRN 1 and PRN 30 have a Doppler frequency offset of-2394 Hz at
minute 112.8 (1747.8Z). These basic characteristics of the intersection of Doppler
frequencies were used to optimize the CW jamming tests.
Receiver clock bias was very linear, and the receiver clock drift rate settled out
over the first 100 minutes Figure 1.12. Earlier testing revealed an interesting event
regarding receiver clock drift rate and the observed Doppler frequencies. For the time
period used for testing, the Doppler frequency values typically ranged from +3.1 kHz to
-4.9 kHz. This bias is discussed in greater detail in Section 4.9, Special Observations.

4.5.2 TEST2 RESULTS (FIGURES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX J)
Test 2 results for the data collected at a one second sample rate between 1500Z
and 1730Z on 30 November 1998 under a no jamming scenario were analyzed next. A
general sense of the receiver operation can be gathered from the polar plots of the
satellite constellation in Figures J.l and J.2 and the PRN number used in the navigation
solution in Figure J.3. PRN 1,21,25 and 29 are shown at relatively high elevation
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angles and were used in conjunction with other satellites such as PRN 5 and 15. Figure
J.4 relates the satellite PRNs being tracked by each receiver channel and Figures J. 13 to
J. 18 indicate the C/N0 for each of the tracking channels. GDOP values from Figure J.5
typically ranged between 2 and 4.
The Doppler frequency offsets are shown in Figures J.6 to J.9. In particular, the
multipath effects on PRN 14 are evident in Figure J.7 at minute 80, 84 and 88. From
Figure J.4 it was determined that PRN 14 was being tracked on channel 4. A review of
Figure J.14 for channel 4 showed strong peaks and troughs in the C/N0 during this time
frame for PRN 14.
Further analysis of the C/N0 plots for low elevation satellites revealed an
interesting characteristic. As shown with PRN 14, both channel 3, PRN 8 in Figure J.14
(channel 3) and channel 8, PRN 23 in Figure J. 16 (channel 8) exhibit periodic peaks and
troughs in the C/N0. This periodic increase and decrease in C/N0 is a characteristic of
multipath effects observed at low satellite elevation angles. As the multipath signals
change in phase with the relative change in path lengths due to the relative motion of
the satellite and the user, the multipath error on the code chip increases and decreases as
a function of the C/N0.
From Figure J.4 it was determined that PRN 5 was being tracked on channel 2,
and PRN 8 was being tracked on channel 3. Figure J.8 is a detailed expansion of Figure
J.6 highlighting PRN 8 and PRN 5 loss of lock at minute 98 and minute 100
respectively. Both PRN 8 and PRN 5 regained lock within a minute. As can be seen
from the C/N0 for these events in Figure J. 14 channel 3, and Figure J. 13 channel 2, the
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loss of lock for one minute occurred. Channel 2 broke lock at 33 dB-Hz, and regained
lock at 37 dB-Hz. Channel 3 broke lock at 32 dB-Hz and regained lock at 34 dB-Hz (a
short spike to 55 dB-Hz appears). From Figures J.6 and J.13 (channel 2) it can be seen
that PRN 5 broke and regained lock once more before finally losing lock completely.
From Figures J.6 and J.14 (channel 3) it can be seen that PRN 8 finally broke lock at
minute 120. The loss of lock for PRN 5 and PRN 8 can be related to low elevation
angles from Figure J.2 for both satellites.
Although it is not immediately obvious from Figure J.6, PRN 15, which is
tracked on channel 5, exhibited an interesting characteristic highlighted in Figure J.9.
For an unknown reason the tracking channel broke lock for a five second period at
minute 105,109 and 112. The loss of lock occurred at Doppler offset frequencies of
-2109 Hz, -2252 Hz and -2267 Hz for each of the five second periods respectively. The
loss of lock was evident in the C/N0 plot in Figure J. 15 for channel 5. The loss of lock
was not representative of multipath effects that exhibited large oscillations in Doppler
offset frequency observed during the six weeks of testing. This event is discussed in
further detail in Section 4.9, Special Observations.
The C/No for PRN 1, which was tracked by channel 1 and channel 12 (Figure
J.4), appeared nearly identical (Figure J.13 channel 1 and Figure J.18 channel 12). By
expanding both of these plots to extreme levels, small differences were seen between
the two channels. The receiver demonstrated similar clock bias and drift rates in Figure
J. 12 as for Test 1 on 20 Nov 98 (Figure 1.12).
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The overall position error in the ECEF coordinate system had a mean of-0.292
meters in the X direction, -0.428 meters in the Y direction and 0.987 meters in the Z
direction. The 3D position error was calculated to have a mean of 5.848 meters and a
standard deviation of 3.112 meters (see section 4.5.1 for the method used to calculate
3D position error). Other positional information included the example of position error
and increases in GDOP.
At minute 82 and minute 96 in Figure J.5 an increase in GDOP occurred, the
associated increase in position error above 20 meters is evident in Figure J. 11. The
changes in the combination of satellites used in the navigation solution, as shown in
Figure J.3, resulted in GDOP changes, as shown in Figure J.5.
From Figure J.6 it can be seen that there are occasions when two satellite PRN
numbers have the same Doppler frequency offset. For example, PRN 15 and PRN 29
have a Doppler frequency offset of-678 Hz at minute 70, (1610Z). PRN 30 and PRN
29 have a Doppler frequency offset of-1056 Hz at minute 93.2 (1633.2Z). PRN 1 and
PRN 15 have a Doppler frequency offset of-1991 Hz at minute 103 (1643Z); and PRN
1 and PRN 30 have a Doppler frequency offset of-2370 Hz at minute 127 (1707Z).
The results from the first two weeks of pre-tests verified that the constellation
generally repeated its ground track. However, each satellite appears earlier each day by
approximately 3 minutes and 56 seconds (the difference in a mean solar day and a
sidereal day). Results of Test 1 and Test 2 for four cases involving the intersection of
Doppler frequency offsets are provided in Table 4.4 and highlight the advance of the
ground tracks with respect to time. For example over a ten day period between 20 and
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30 November 1998, the intersection of PRNs was expected to advance by 39.33 minutes
(10 x 3 min 56 sec). The actual results for the intersection of the PRN 15 and 29, PRN
30 and 29, PRN 1 and 15, and PRN 1 and 30 are included in Table 4.4. By comparing
Test 1 and Test 2 results with test data collected during the last three weeks of
November 98 (not presented in thesis), the characteristics of the intersection of Doppler
frequencies were determined and subsequently used to optimize the CW jamming tests.
For the case of a stationary/slow velocity receiver, ie. people walking/running,
ships, or hovering helicopters, the additional Doppler shift due to receiver motion would
be relatively small (5.255 Hz at LI for every meter/second of range rate). With the
knowledge of Doppler shift from each satellite and velocity of a target vehicle, it is
feasible that a "smart stationary CW jammer" could be optimized to jam specific
frequencies and hence specific channels in a GPS receiver.

20Nov
98
30Nov
98
Delta

PRN 15 and 29
1649Z
-617 Hz

PRN 30 and 29
1711.52Z
-970 Hz

PRN 1 and 15
-2031 Hz 1725.12Z

PRN 1 and 30
-2394 Hz 1747.81Z,

-678 Hz

1609.59Z

-1056 Hz

1633.18Z

-1991 Hz

1643Z

-2370 Hz

1706.59Z

61 Hz

39.4 min

86 Hz

37.94 min

40 Hz

42.12 min

24 Hz

41.22 min

Table 4.4 - PRN Doppler Frequency Offset Intercepts

The advancement of ground track with respect to time can also be seen by
comparing the satellite constellation for the same time of day between 1500Z 30
November 1998 in Figure J.l and 1500Z 10 December 1998 in Figure S.l.
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4.6 CWJAMMING TEST RESULTS
This section discusses the results of CW jamming conducted in Tests 3-8 and
the respective figures are contained in Appendices K to P.

4.6.1 TEST 3 RESULTS (FIGURES CONTAINED IN APPENDIXE)
Data collected at a rate of one sample per five seconds for Test 3 between 1603Z
and 2007Z on 16 November 1998 were analyzed. The test included no jamming for the
first 2 minutes followed by a setting of 85 dB on the attenuator resulting in a J/S of 20.7
dB for the duration of the test.
An overview of the satellite constellation status is provided in Figures K. 1 and
K.2 and the satellite PRN numbers used in the navigation solution in Figure K.3. Figure
K.4 relates the satellite PRNs being tracked by each receiver channel and Figures K. 13
to K. 18 indicates the C/N0 for each of the tracking channels. GDOP values from
Figure K.5 typically ranged between 2 and 5 over the first 160 minutes. At minute 169
and minute 187 GDOP was reported as 2000, indicative of the receiver having ceased
generating a navigation solution.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Test 3 results are that the receiver
tracking channels actually lock on to the CW jamming signal and track the jamming
signal rather than the actual GPS signal. The jamming was constant throughout the
period and the receiver's ability to calculate a correct position actually degraded over
time as different tracking channels locked on to the CW signal at different times (see
position errors in Figure K. 10). The lock of a tracking channel on to the CW signal was
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characterized for periods of a fairly constant C/N0 value commencing at minute 67 in
Figure K.14 channel 4 (PRN 14) and commencing at minute 73 in Figure K.13 channel
2 (PRN 5). The jamming signal was set at LI. The spreading of the jamming signal by
the multiplication of the jamming signal with the C/A spreading code in the receiver
demonstrated the 1000 Hz spectral characteristics of the CW signal after reception by
the receiver. Jamming lines occurred at 3008 Hz, 1011 Hz, -2992 Hz, -3989 Hz as
shown in Figure K.6. Slight differences in the magnitude of the 1000 Hz spaced lines
over time resulted from either a very slow drift in the signal generator or receiver clock
drift rate over the jamming period.
In particular PRN 14 on channel 4 (Figure K.4) immediately locked on to the
jamming signal at minute 67 when tracking channel 4 switched from PRN 9 to PRN 14
(Figure K.7). Figure K. 14 channel 4 highlights the loss of PRN 9 at minute 27 and the
lock of PRN 14 onto the actual CW signal at minute 67 at 3008 Hz. The C/N0 for PRN
14 was approximately 35 dB-Hz (Figure K. 14) while it was tracking the jamming signal
up to the minute 120 point where channel 4 regained lock on the actual satellite signal
PRN 14 (Figure K.8). (Notice the steady Doppler frequency offset during periods of a
channel locked on to the CW signal in Figure K.7).
PRN 5 on channel 2 (Figures K.4 and K.7) locked on to the jamming signal at
minute 73 at -2992 Hz; at minute 108 the tracking channel switched to PRN 22 but
immediately locked on to the CW signal at 3011 Hz (Figure K.8) and continued to
maintain lock on the CW signal until minute 130 when the tracking channel finally
gained lock on PRN 22. The lock of channel 2 on to the CW signal is evident in the
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C/No plot in Figure K. 13 for channel 2. The spike at minute 108 in the C/N0 plot
occurred at the transition of locking on to the CW signal for the two frequencies.
PRN 8 on channel 3 (Figure K.4) locked on to the jamming signal at minute 92
at -3989 Hz (Figure K.7) and at minute 137 the tracking channel switched to PRN 6 but
immediately locked on to the CW signal at 1011 Hz (Figure K.8). The tracking channel
locked on to PRN 6 at minute 140 and maintained lock until minute 151 when the
channel locked on to the CW signal again. The lock of channel 3 on to the CW signal is
evident in the C/N0 plot in Figure K. 14 for channel 3.
PRN 15 on channel 5 (Figure K.4) locked on to the jamming signal for a ten
minute period starting at minute 160 at -3988 Hz (Figure K.8). The lock of channel 5
on to the CW signal is evident in the C/N0 plot in Figure K. 15 for channel 5 between
minutes 160 and 170.
Quite interesting is the fact that while PRN 5 is locked on to the CW signal the
receiver continues to include PRN 5 in the navigation solution for up to ten minutes.
After reviewing several data runs over the first few weeks of testing it became clear that
the receiver uses the best GDOP solution of satellites for which the receiver has carrier
lock in order to determine which satellites to use in the navigation solution. This is an
extremely dangerous navigation solution criterion if the receiver is used in a CW
jamming environment. During this research, various reference material alluded to the
fact that CW interference normally only impacts a single channel in a receiver due to
the different Doppler frequencies for each channel. While this is true at low J/S values,
the XR5-M receiver demonstrates a dangerous weakness in receiver design if a single
4-23

bad channel is allowed into the navigation solution. Clearly there is a need to be aware
of the impact of CW interference on position error when designing GPS receivers.
Techniques to reduce RF interference are discussed further in Appendix G.
The best GDOP solution can occur with a combination of SVs including the one
with carrier lock on CW and therefore the receiver includes the bad satellite as one of
the five SVs used in navigation solution. Because of the lack of code and no data
modulation, bit synchronization is clearly a problem; errors grow from the typical unjammed seven meter error (observed in Test 1 and 2) to over 12 kilometers. The
receiver is "intelligent" enough to recognize a problem based on valid fix criteria;
however, position errors grow to very large values before the receiver finally flags the
fixes as no longer valid. Test 12, Section 4.8.1, was designed specifically to investigate
in detail the magnitude of position error when the receiver flags the fix as no longer
valid.
At minute 187 position error had grown to over 100 km (Figure K.10) and the
receiver "finally threw in the towel" and reset (Figures K.4 and K. 12). Keep in mind
that the receiver had flagged the position as invalid at a smaller position error value.
From Figure K.6 and an expansion of the time frame in Figure K.9, the Doppler
frequency offsets are dominated by the jamming signal. The C/N0 plots of Figures K. 13
to K. 18 exhibit rapid switching between the actual satellite signals and the jamming
signal as the receiver is reassigning different PRNs to each of the tracking channels.
The receiver regains a valid fix for the last 30 minutes of the run using PRNs 1, 6,14,
25 and 29. A further look at the Doppler frequency offset plot of Figure K.6 indicates
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that these five satellites are the only satellites that have not locked on to jamming
signals. In a sense the receiver was "hanging on by a shoestring."
At a relatively low J/S of 20.7 dB the satellites with low C/N0, ie. near the
horizon, were most likely to be jammed. This was demonstrated when PRN 14, 8, 5,
and 22 locked on to the CW jamming signal (Figures K. 1, K.2 and K.6). The receiver's
ability to determine position degraded significantly whenever at least one of the PRNs
locked on to the CW jamming and was included in the final navigation solution. This
test verified the inherent problems of the XR5-M C/A code receiver even at low
interference levels. Furthermore, it highlighted that a simple CW jamming signal could
spoof this receiver to over 12 kilometers position error. Further analysis of this
spoofing impact is highlighted in Test 12 (see section 4.8.1). Based on the results of
this thesis, testing of other C/A code GPS receivers in the presence of CW jamming is
highly recommended.

4.6.2 TEST 4 RESULTS (FIGURES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX L)
Data collected at a rate of one sample per second for Test 4 between 1554Z and
1700Z on 27 November 1998 were analyzed. The test included a quick look at
jamming for the first 6 minutes with an attenuator setting of 75 dB followed by no
jamming for 18 minutes. Jamming was set to 70 dB on the attenuator resulting in a J/S
of 35.7 dB centered at -694 Hz offset from LI at 1618Z for the duration of the test. The
primary aim of this test was to investigate the feasibility of simultaneously jamming
two PRNs, specifically PRN 15 and PRN 29. Jamming was selected on at minute 24
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just prior to the calculated intercept frequency and time. The main difference between
Test 3 and Test 4 was the increase in J/S and the change in sample rate to once per
second.
An overview of the satellite constellation status is provided in Figures L.l and
L.2 and the satellite PRN numbers used in the navigation solution in Figure L.3. Figure
L.4 relates the satellite PRNs being tracked by each receiver channel and Figures L. 13
to L. 18 indicate the C/N0 for each of the tracking channels. Channel 11 was set to PRN
21 but remained idle throughout the test (PRN 21 was actually tracked on channel 6).
GDOP values from Figure L.5 typically ranged between 2 and 4 over the first 35
minutes. At minute 37 GDOP was reported as 2000, indicative of the receiver having
ceased generating a navigation solution.
The first 6 minutes of jamming were used to investigate the receiver when
subjected to jamming shortly after gaining 3D lock, after initial power up of the system.
Both PRN 8 and PRN 5 locked on to the jamming during the initial six minutes. From
Figure L.3 it can be seen that PRN 5 was not used in the navigation solution but PRN 8
was used resulting in the increase in position error as just evident in Figure L. 10 during
the first few minutes of the test. The wave in Doppler frequency offset (Figure L.6 and
Figure L.7) is believed to be a result of the receiver determining receiver clock drift rate
from the navigation solution which can be seen in the clock drift rate over the first few
minutes of the receiver operation, see Figure L.12. This wave effect is discussed in
more detail in Section 4.9.2.
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The test successfully demonstrated that an individual PRN could be intentionally
jammed at the receiver. PRN 15 and PRN 5 locked on to the CW within 30 seconds of
the commencement of jamming at minute 24 (Figure L.8) at Doppler frequencies of
-694 Hz and -2694 Hz respectively. From Figure L.3 it can be seen that PRN 5 and 15
both momentarily were removed from the navigation solution as they succumbed to the
jamming and C/N0 went to zero very briefly (Figure L.15 channel 5, PRN 15, and
Figure L.13 channel 2, PRN 5). Once locked on to the CW, PRN 5 and 15 were both
being used in the navigation solution. The resulting position error can be seen in Figure
L.ll. Position error began to increase at minute 24.5. PRN 8 and 23 locked on to the
CW approximately 2 minutes later (Figure L.8) at -4694 Hz. Clearly, the rate of change
in position error (Figure L. 11) increased at minute 26.5 as PRN 23 was used in the
navigation solution. PRN 8 was added to the navigation solution at minute 32. By
minute 32, four of the five PRNs used in the navigation solution were locked on to the
CW signal and PRN 1 was the only satellite used in the navigation solution with valid
data. From Figure L. 10 position error was a maximum at 38 kilometers when the
receiver ceased to output a navigation solution.
PRN 29 was at a higher elevation angle and less susceptible to jamming at
initialization; however, at minute 37 the receiver had ceased outputting a navigation
solution and PRN 21, 25,29, 30 had all succumbed to the CW jamming (Figure L.9).
At minute 37, PRN 25 locked on to 305 Hz, PRN 29 and 30 locked on to -695 Hz, and
PRN 21 locked on to -3695 Hz. Additionally, PRN 5 jumped from being jammed at
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-2695 Hz to -3695 Hz. Although a bit of a mute point by this time in the receiver, PRN
14 locked on to 2306 Hz at minute 39. At minute 57 the receiver regained a "shoestring
fix" using PRN 1, 15, 29 and 30. From Figure L.9 and the C/NG plots it can be seen that
these were the only satellites not locked onto the CW jamming signal.
One of the interesting aspects observed was the two minute periodic spikes in
the Doppler frequency in Figure L.6 and expanded in Figure L.9. These spikes were
also clearly evident in the C/N0 plots of Figures L.13 to L.17 and Doppler offset
frequency Figures L.6 and L.9 after minute 36. The spiking in the C/N0 was attributed
to a two minute time-out that caused each of the tracking channels to reset when the
channels were unable to synchronize to the data frame within that period [BUT99].

4.6.3 TEST 5 RESULTS (FIGURES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX M)
Data collected at a rate of one sample per second for Test 5 between 1500Z and
1730Z on 2 December 1998 were analyzed. Test 5 was a repeat of Test 4 except that
the jamming center frequency was offset by +1958 Hz from LI. Jamming was set to 70
dB on the attenuator resulting in a J/S of 35.7 dB. The intent of commencing jamming
at minute 80 was to jam two PRNs simultaneously by targeting the intersection of the
Doppler frequency for PRN 30 and PRN 29 at 1620Z.
An overview of the satellite constellation status is provided in Figures M.l and
M.2 and the satellite PRN numbers used in the navigation solution in Figure M.3.
Figure M.4 relates the satellite PRNs being tracked by each receiver channel and
Figures M. 13 to M. 18 indicate the C/N0 for each of the tracking channels. Channel 11
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was idle throughout the test. As shown in Figure M.5, GDOP values typically ranged
between 2 and 4 over the first 99 minutes. However, at minute 99 GDOP was reported
as fixed at 2000, indicative of the receiver having ceased generating a navigation
solution for the remainder of the test (Figures M.3 and M.6). Multipath effects on PRN
14 on channel 4 were again observed at minute 72 (Figure M.7) with the characteristic
peaks and troughs in the C/N0 in Figure M. 14 channel 4.
The Doppler frequency offset (Figure M.8) highlights the effect of jamming at
minute 80. The actual CW jamming frequency was 1958 Hz above LI. PRN 25 was
jammed and was followed by PRN 30 being jammed within two minutes. PRN 14, 5, 8
and 23 were all jammed; however, PRN 29 was not jammed. These results highlight
that it is feasible to jam a particular satellite. The higher jamming levels required to
jam higher elevation satellites cause a type of collateral damage in that PRNs closer to
the horizon were more susceptible to jamming and tended to lock on to the CW signal
as well.
From Figures M.8 and M.9 it can be seen that the frequencies at which the
various PRNs were jammed were once again spaced by the 1000 Hz spreading of the
CW jamming signal by the C/A code. One exception occurred in Figure M.9, where the
tracking channel actually locked on to a signal that was exactly 500 Hz between the
jamming lines of-1040 Hz and -2040 Hz at -1540 Hz. This event is the subject of
further study.
The position error for the period of 80 to 100 minutes is shown in Figure M. 11.
At minute 99, all channels of the receiver were locked on to the CW signal except for
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PRN 21 on channel 7 which maintained intermittent lock (Figures M.6 and M. 16
channel 7). The two minute periodic spikes in the Doppler frequency previously
observed in Test 4 were observed again in Figure M.9. These spikes are also evident in
the C/N0 plots of Figures M. 13 to M. 17.
The jamming in Test 4 was centered at -694 Hz from LI while during Test 5 the
jamming was offset from LI by +1958 Hz. Based on the results of Test 4 and Test 5 it
would appear that the +1958 Hz offset from LI in Test 5 was slightly more effective in
that 6 satellites were simultaneously jammed. In Test 4, four satellites were jammed
shortly after jamming was initiated. In both Test 4 and Test 5, position errors exceeded
10 km within 5 minutes after jamming commenced.

4.6.4 TEST 6 RESULTS (FIGURES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX N)
Data collected at a rate of one sample per second for Test 6 between 1500Z and
1730Z on 3 December 1998 were analyzed. Test 6 differed from Test 4 and Test 5 by
both a change in center frequency and jamming power level. The receivers were
allowed to operate for the first 75 minutes with no jamming. During Test 6 the
jamming center frequency was offset by +63 kHz from LI and the jamming level was
set at 80 dB on the attenuator resulting in a J/S of 25.7 dB at minute 75, the jamming
was on for the remainder of the test. From Table 6.4 of [KAP96], PRN 30 is
theoretically more susceptible to jamming than the other satellites at 63 kHz offset from
LI. The intent of Test 6 was to investigate selectively jamming an individual satellite
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Signal using the characteristic strongest spectral line for a specific PRN C/A code at a
moderately low J/S.
An overview of the satellite constellation status is provided in Figures N.l and
N.2 and the satellite PRN numbers used in the navigation solution in Figure N.3. Figure
N.4 relates the satellite PRNs tracked by each receiver channel and Figures N.13 to
N.18 indicates the C/N0 for each of the tracking channels. Channel 11 was idle
throughout the test. GDOP values typically ranged between 2 and 4 over the first 115
minutes. At minute 120 GDOP was reported as 2000, as shown in Figure N.5;
however, the receiver had flagged position invalid as of minute 89.7 at a position error
of 5.5 km. The receiver regained lock at minute 142 and retained lock for the remaining
eight minutes of the test but was somewhat marginal given that only six tracking
channels were not being jammed (Figures N.3, N.6 and N.9).
It can be seen that PRN 5 on channel 2 (Figure N.4) was the cause of the wide
dark vertical swath in the Doppler frequency offset in Figure N.6 and expanded in
Figure N.7. Multipath effects on PRN 14 were again observed in Figure N.6 and the
corresponding C/N0 plot of channel 4 in Figure N.14 highlights the oscillation in the
C/N0. The appearance of multipath on PRN 14 at minute 76 in Figure N.8 may have
been partially enhanced by the commencement of jamming at minute 75.
As shown in Figure N.8, within two minutes of the commencement of jamming,
PRN 30 locked on to the jamming at -1058 Hz and PRN 8 locked on to the jamming at
-4058 Hz. Also, PRN 5 locked on to the jamming signal at minute 88. PRN 30 was
tracked on channel 10 and the jamming effects can be seen in the C/N0 plot of Figure
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N.17. PRN 8 was tracked on channel 3, and the jamming effects can be seen in the
C/No plot of Figure N. 14 for channel 3. PRN 5 was tracked on channel 2 and the
corresponding effects can be seen in the C/N0 plot of Figure N.13 for channel 2.
Although PRN 8 and PRN 30 were jammed at minute 77, the two satellites were
not being used in the navigation solution (Figure N.3). From Figure N.3 PRN 5 was
used in the navigation solution during the timeframe between minute 75
(commencement of jamming) and minute 100. The locking of PRN 5 on to the
jamming signal at minute 88 corresponds with the beginning of an increase in the
position error in Figures N. 10 and N. 11. Interestingly, at minute 100, PRN 5 was
removed from the navigation solution and replaced by PRN 8 (which was also jammed).
Position error continued to increase as seen in Figure N.10 at minute 100 as PRN 8 was
added to the solution. If the reader looks closely at the period from minute 100 to
minute 115 it can be seen that PRN 8 switches to PRN 14 with the combination of other
satellites (PRN 1, 15, 21, and 25) which results in a valid fix. Note however there is an
increase in GDOP at minute 106 as a result of this new assignment. The inherent
weakness of the XR5-M receiver is highlighted when the receiver opts to switch back to
using PRN 8 in place of PRN 14 because of improved GDOP. Unfortunately position
error begins to rapidly grow again. The receiver again switches to PRN 14 at minute
111 and obtains a valid fix but the GDOP once again increases. During the next
combination the receiver selects PRN 14, 21, 25, 29 and 30. Unfortunately, again for
the XR5-M receiver, PRN 30 is jammed (Figure N.6) and the position error continues to
grow rapidly. Keep in mind throughout this increase in position error only one of the
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five satellites in the navigation solution was locked on to the CW jammer. Furthermore
it only took 3 of the receiver channels to be jammed to drive the receiver into a rapidly
degraded state.
From the Doppler frequency offset plot of Figure N.9 and the various C/N0 plots
(Figures N. 13 to N. 17) the receiver tracking channels were more severely impacted by
the jamming signal. The rapid spiking in C/N0 plots associated with the vertical spikes
in the Doppler frequencies indicates that the receiver was more vulnerable to
interference than during the earlier stages of jamming even though there was no change
in jamming levels.
It must be reiterated that the XR5-M receiver actually flagged the position error
as no longer valid once the position error was 5.5 km at second 5384 into the run
(minute 89 and 44 seconds). The insight into the XR5-M receiver calculations
highlights the impact of a single jammed channel being used in the navigation solution
and how the position error continued to grow over the period.
Test 6 results demonstrated the jamming of a selected PRN using the technique
of selecting a center frequency at the maximum magnitude spectral line for a given PRN
code. It was also noted in Table 6.4 [KAP96] that PRN 8 has a maximum magnitude at
a spectral line of 66 kHz. This probably attributed to the jamming of PRN 8 given the
3 kHz spacing between PRN 8 and PRN 30 at the instance that both PRNs locked on to
the CW, keeping in mind that the spectral lines would be mirrored through LI.
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4.6.5 TEST 7 RESULTS (FIGURES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX 0)
Data collected at a rate of one sample per second for Test 7 between 1500Z and
1710Z on 8 December 1998 were analyzed. The receivers were allowed to operate for
the first 30 minutes with no jamming. The aim of Test 7 was to investigate the impact
of jamming at LI at various jamming levels. Jamming was on for two or three minutes
followed by eight minutes of no jamming allowing the receiver to regain lock. The
attenuator was set at four different levels 85, 80, 75 and 70 dB resulting in J/S of 20.7,
25.7, 30.7, and 35.7 dB (Table 4.1) as shown in Figure 0.18.
An overview of the satellite constellation status is provided in Figures O.l and
0.2 and the satellite PRN numbers used in the navigation solution in Figure 0.3.
Figure 0.4 relates the satellite PRNs being tracked by each receiver channel and Figures
0.12 to 0.17 indicate the C/N0 for each of the tracking channels. Channel 11 was idle
throughout the test. GDOP values typically ranged between 2 and 5 over the first 110
minutes. At minute 110 GDOP spiked to 24 (Figure 0.5).
As shown in Figure 0.6, the effects of various levels of jamming on the Doppler
frequency offset can be seen at minutes 30, 40, 50, 60, 80, 90, 100, and 110. A general
lowering of the C/N„ levels can also be seen at these times in Figures 0.12 to 0.17.
From the C/N0 plots it can also be seen that when the tracking channels lock on to the
CW, the C/No demonstrates a fairly constant value during each jamming window. In
some cases the plots indicate a higher C/N0 for higher jamming levels such as for
channel 2 in Figure 0.12 at minute 60 and 110.
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At minute 30 a small ripple is seen in the Doppler frequency offset plot, shown
in Figure 0.7, for PRN 8 (channel 3 from Figure 0.4). Channel 3 broke lock
momentarily as shown in the C/N0 plot of Figure 0.13 for channel 3. Although it did
not lose lock at minute 40 even though the jamming level was 5 dB higher, the lowering
of C/No was still evident in Figure 0.13 for channel 3. At minute 50 and minute 60,
PRN 8 (channel 3) locked on to the jamming signal at -3994 Hz as shown in Figure 0.7.
The locking on to the CW is evident in the C/N0 plot for channel 3 in Figure 0.13 as the
C/No actually increased during the two minute jamming periods at minute 50 and
minute 60.
At minute 50 and 60, PRN 5 (channel 2) locked on to the CW jammer (Figure
0.7) at -2994 Hz and exhibited similar characteristics in Figure 0.12 for channel 2 as
previously shown for channel 3. At minute 60, PRN 14 (channel 4) and PRN 25
(channel 8) were also locked on to the CW jammer (Figure 0.7) at 3006 Hz and 6 Hz
respectively.
From the C/N0 plots of Figures 0.12 to 0.17 it can be seen that PRN 1 (on
channel 1 and 12) and PRN 21 on channel 6 were the only two satellites not to lose lock
due to the jamming. A dip in C/N0 values to 37 dB-Hz and 30 dB-Hz occurred for the
two PRNs respectively at minute 63. From the C/N0 plots it appears that had the
jamming been sustained for a longer duration that both of these PRNs would have broke
lock.
At minute 80 receiver channel 7 ceased attempting to track PRN 23 and
attempted to track PRN 22 (Figure 0.4). The Doppler frequency offset plot of Figure
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0.8 highlights the tracking channels for PRN 22 (channel 7), and PRN 5 (channel 2)
after the jamming ceased at minute 82. PRN 22 regained lock at minute 88 and PRN 5
regained lock at minute 83 but because the satellites were low on the horizon they were
more susceptible to losing lock. At minute 90, PRN 22 did not lock on to the CW but
PRN 5 did (PRN 22 was increasing in elevation angle while PRN 5 was decreasing). At
minute 92, although the jamming had ceased, the receiver continued fixed at -2990 Hz
until the jamming commenced again at minute 100, when PRN 5 locked on to -4990
Hz. At minute 110 channel 2 ceased to attempt tracking on PRN 5, switched to PRN 6
and immediately locked on to the jamming. PRN 22 locked onto the CW jammer at
3011 Hz. The effects on C/N0 are highlighted in Figure 0.15 for PRN 22 on channel 7
and in Figure 0.12 for PRN 5 on channel 2.
The increase in position error at minutes 50, 60 and 110 are shown in Figures
0.9 and 0.10. At minutes 50 and 60, PRN 5, which was locked on to the CW signal,
was used in the navigation solution (Figure 0.3) and corresponded to the increase in
position error to a maximum of 4.05 km and 12.33 km for the two respective times.
The receiver reported the error of 4.1 km as a valid 3D fix at minute 52; however, at
minute 61.8 the receiver flagged the error as invalid by the time the error had grown to
6.8 km.
At minute 100, PRNs 1,14, 21, 25 and 29 were used in the navigation solution;
none of which were locked on to the CW signal and hence no dramatic increase in
position error occurred for this jamming window. Between minute 110 and 112 during
the last jamming window, both PRN 22 and PRN 30 (locked on to the CW jamming
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Figure 0.8) were used in the navigation solution and resulted in an increase in position
error to 5.6 km (Figure 0.10). The receiver continued to report this as a valid position.

4.6.6 TEST 8 RESULTS (FIGURES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX P)
Data collected at a rate of one sample per second for Test 8 between 1510Z and
1710Z on 11 December 1998 were analyzed. The receivers were allowed to operate for
the first 20 minutes with no jamming. Since low elevation satellite signals are generally
more susceptible to interference, the aim of Test 8 was to investigate the impact of
jamming at LI at various jamming levels and to investigate the concept of increasing
the elevation mask angle to 25 degrees in order to remove low elevation jammed
satellites from the navigation solution. Jamming was on for two minutes followed by
three minutes of no jamming allowing the receiver to regain lock. The attenuator was
set at four different levels 85, 80, 75 and 70 dB resulting in J/S of 20.7, 25.7, 30.7, and
35.7 dB as shown in Figure P. 19.
An overview of the satellite constellation status is provided in Figures P.l and
P.2 and the satellite PRN numbers used in the navigation solution in Figure P.3. Figure
P.4 relates the satellite PRNs being tracked by each receiver channel and Figures P. 13
to P. 18 indicate the C/N„ for each of the tracking channels. Channels 6, 10, and 11
were idle throughout the test. GDOP values were higher than previous tests since the
available number of satellites were limited by the increased elevation angle. GDOP
typically ranged between 3 and 5 over the first 50 minutes. GDOP spikes occurred at
minute 60, 65, 67, and minute 70 with values of 126, 89, 78, and 23 respectively (Figure
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P.5). The spike in GDOP to a value of 1000 at minute 92 was associated with the
receiver switching from a 3D fix to a 2D fix, but the receiver quickly regained 3D fix
status within seven seconds. The large vertical spikes of C/N0 as a result of the
jamming are highlighted for PRN 1 on channel 1 in Figure P. 13 and channel 12 in
Figure P. 18.
At the beginning of data capture, PRN 5 (on channel 2) was already slightly
below the 25 degree elevation angle and at minute 10, PRN 5 ceased to be tracked by
the receiver at an elevation angle of 20 degrees and Doppler frequency offset was set at
a constant value. PRN 5 (channel 2) locked on to the CW jammer at -4073 Hz at
minutes 20 and 25, - 3068 Hz at minute 30 and -5070 Hz at minute 35. The effects of
CW jamming on PRN 5 are highlighted in Figure P. 13 for channel 2 for the first 37
minutes of the plot. The wide swaths generated by PRN 5 were a result of the receiver
channel searching once the jamming was switched off. It should be noted that between
minute 40 and 50, PRN 5 (channel 2) was not locked on to the jammer but
demonstrated constant Doppler frequency. This was attributed to the fact that the
receiver would recognize that the satellite was below the elevation mask angle once it
attempted to regain lock using previous ephemeris/almanac data (Figure P.7).
At minute 20, PRN 8 ceased to be tracked as the elevation angle passed below
25 degrees and is shown in Figure P. 14 for channel 3. At minute 35, PRN 25 on
channel 7 locked on to the CW jammer at -70 Hz for two minutes as shown in Figure
P.7. Since PRN 25 was used in the navigation solution, an increase in position error up
to 1.28 km resulted as noted in Figure P. 10 for minute 35.5 to 37. Between minute 65.2
4-38

and 67.2 position error increased to a maximum value of 11.75 km (Figure P. 11) as a
result of PRN 30 on channel 9 being locked on to CW jammer (Figure P.8) and being
used in the navigation solution. Channel 9 regained lock on the valid PRN 30 once the
jamming was removed and as a result the large position error was removed. The
XR5-M receiver reported that the GPS 3D fix was valid even though position errors had
grown to 1.28 and 11.75 km for the above two periods (Figures P. 10 and P. 11).
At minute 90 channel 3 commenced attempting to lock on to PRN 22 but locked
on to the CW jamming instead at 2945 Hz as shown in Figure P.9. The wide frequency
swath between minute 92 and 95 is the receiver searching for PRN 22. At minute 95
while channel 3 was still searching for PRN 22 the channel locked on to the CW
jamming at 946 Hz. Channel 3 finally gained lock on PRN 22 at minute 97 once the
jamming ceased.
During Test 7 the jamming of PRN 5 resulted in an increased position error.
The increase in elevation mask angle to 25 degrees during Test 8 prevented PRN 5 from
being used in the navigation solution even though it was locked on to jamming signal
and resulted in improved position measurements during jamming windows compared to
Test 7.

4.7 SWEPT CW TEST RESULTS
This section discusses the results of swept CW jamming conducted in Test 9-11
and the respective figures are contained in Appendix Q, R and S.
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4.7.1 TEST 9 RESULTS (FIGURES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX Q)
Data collected at a rate of one sample per second for Test 9 between 1500Z and
1700Z on 6 December 1998 were analyzed. The XR5-M receivers were allowed to
operate for the first 30 minutes with no jamming. The aim of Test 9 was to investigate
the impact of swept CW jamming centered at LI at five jamming levels, and for three
frequency spans (2 MHz, 200 kHz, and 20 kHz). Sweep time of the signal generator
was set to 20 seconds. Jamming was on for two minutes followed by three minutes of
no jamming allowing the receiver to regain lock. The attenuator was set at five
different levels 85, 80, 75, 70, and 65 dB resulting in J/S of 20.7, 25.7, 30.7, 35.7, and
40.7 dB as shown in Figure Q.20.
An overview of the satellite constellation status is provided in Figures Q. 1 and
Q.2 and the satellite PRN numbers used in the navigation solution in Figure Q.3. Figure
Q.4 relates the satellite PRNs tracked by each XR5-M receiver channel and Figures
Q. 14 to Q. 19 indicate the C/N0 for each of the tracking channels. Channel 11 was idle
throughout the test with one exception at minute 80 (during the highest jamming level).
GDOP values typically ranged between 2 and 4 over the first 35 minutes. Large GDOP
spikes were associated with the swept CW jamming windows (Figure Q.5). The large
vertical spikes in C/N0 as a result of the jamming are evident in Figures Q. 14 to Q. 19.
The large dark vertical swaths in Figure Q. 3 are a result of the receiver rapidly
changing the satellite PRNs used in the navigation solution. This was a result of the
jammer sweeping through the tracking channels and rapidly causing the tracking
channels to break and regain lock on the satellite signals. The highest jamming levels
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commenced at minute 50, 80, and 110. From Figure Q.4 it can be seen that the receiver
did a complete reset of assigned PRNs to the tracking channels at minute 80.
During the pure CW jamming in Tests 3 to Test 8, the receiver locked on to the
jammer for long periods of time as evident in the long horizontal lines in the Doppler
frequency offset plots. From the Doppler frequency offset Figures Q.7 and Q.8 the
large vertical spikes in frequency, which result from the swept CW jamming, are
evident as jamming commences at minutes 40, 45, 50, 65, 70, 75, and 80. The
magnitude of vertical deflection generally increases as the jamming level increases.
Once the jamming ceased, the areas of vertical deflection indicated the XR5-M receiver
searching to regain lock. Because the tracking channels were pulled off frequency by a
large amount during the jamming, the receiver channels were unable to reacquire the
actual GPS signal once jamming ceased. As a result, the tracking channels remained in
reacquire mode for up to three minutes until the next jamming window which then
pulled the tracking channel frequencies off even further in frequency (Figure Q.9).
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the swept CW jamming compared to
results of Test 3 to Test 8 are the relatively small position errors as shown in Figures
Q. 11 and Q. 12. The jamming at minute 50 to 52 caused the receiver to lose lock and
the 3D position error increased to only 24.7 meters. Other examples of rather small
position errors for minutes 75.8, 101.6,105.2, and 112.2 were 102.0, 77.8, 49.2 and
19.3 meters respectively.
From the results it can be seen that the highest swept CW jamming levels of J/S
of 40.7 dB during Test 9 caused the receiver to cease providing valid navigation data.
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The receiver underwent rapid loss of carrier and code lock and was forced to reacquire
the satellite as a result of the jamming. For the center frequency, frequency span, and
sweep width used in this test, the position errors were relatively small compared to the
position errors from pure CW jamming results of Test 3 to Test 8. There was one
exception to the position error observations with a spike at minute 82 after the complete
channel reset shown in Figure Q.4.

4.7.2 TEST 10 RESULTS (FIGURES CONTAINED IN APPENDIXR)
Data collected at a rate of one sample per second for Test 10 between 1500Z and
1710Z on 7 December 98 were analyzed. The receivers were allowed to operate for the
first 30 minutes with no jamming. The aim of Test 10 was to investigate the impact of
swept CW jamming centered at LI at four jamming levels, and for two different
frequency spans (20 kHz and 10 kHz). The sweep time on the signal generator was set
to 20 seconds. Jamming was on for two minutes followed by eight minutes of no
jamming allowing the receiver to regain lock. There is a no jamming period of 18
minutes between minute 62 and minute 80 to allow the receiver to regain lock and avoid
any impact on the next jamming period. The attenuator was set at four different levels
85, 80, 75, and 70 dB resulting in J/S of 20.7, 25.7, 30.7 and 35.7 as shown in Figure
R.18.
An overview of the satellite constellation status is provided in Figures R.1 and
R.2 and the satellite PRN numbers used in the navigation solution in Figure R.3. Figure
R.4 relates the satellite PRNs being tracked by each receiver channel and Figures R.12
4-42

to R17 indicate the C/N0 for each of the tracking channels. Channel 11 was idle
throughout the test. GDOP values typically ranged between 2 and 4 over the first 50
minutes with one jump at minute 31 up to a GDOP of 23 as shown in Figure R.5. From
Figure R.3 jamming at minute 30, 40, 50, 60, 80, 90,100, and 110 results in the receiver
assigning different combinations of five PRNs to the navigation solution. Large GDOP
spikes were associated with the higher swept CW jamming levels at minutes 50, 60,
100, and 110 (Figure R.5). The large vertical spikes of C/N0, as a result of the jamming,
are evident in Figures R. 12 to R. 17.
The receiver ceased calculation of positional information intermittently at
minute 60 to 63 and between minute 110 and minute 114. GDOP values were reported
as 2000 for these periods of positional information outages. These outage windows
were associated with the highest jamming levels during this test. As shown in the
Doppler plot in Figure R.8, with the start of jamming at minute 110, eight of the
tracking channels were pulled off. For the next eight minutes the tracking channels
attempted to reacquire. PRNs 25 and 15 regained lock allowing a valid navigation
solution to be achieved; however, PRNs 14, 1, 22, 29 and 30 remained in reacquire
mode until minute 120 when all the channels finally regained lock. This same
observation was noted on PRN 14 in Figure R.7, when PRN 14 was jammed at minute
60-62 and was in reacquire mode for eight minutes until it regained lock at minute 70.
It would appear from this that the XR5-M receiver was designed to remain in the
reacquire mode for at least eight minutes. Similar results were obtained as shown in
Figure R.8 for jamming from minute 100 to minute 102. After the jamming was
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removed at minute 102, PRNs 14, 22, 30, 15, and 5 remained in reacquire mode until
jamming was turned on again at minute 110 and the channels were again pulled off to
the jamming signals. These results reinforce the concept that more than eight minutes
should be allowed for the XR5-M receiver to regain lock prior to conducting another
jamming window. As a result of using the eight minute time frame between jamming
windows, the results of the window from minute 110 to 120 are biased from the
previous jamming window of minute 100 to minute 102. Future testing should account
for more than eight minutes between test windows to allow all the XR5-M receiver
channels to regain lock.
In terms of position errors, at minute 110, the receiver broke 3D fix status, but
the 3D position error was less than 30 meters (Figures R.9 and R. 10). The worst case
position error of approximately 220 meters for this test resulted at minute 60 (Figure
R.9). This error was reflected in the change in receiver clock drift rate as shown in
Figure R. 11 at minute 60.
Figures R. 12 to R. 17 highlight the effects of the swept CW on the C/N0 values.
From Figure R.4 the receiver tracking channel 1 was tracking PRN 1 and channel 9 was
tracking PRN 29. The C/N0 for PRN 1 (channel 1 Figure R12) and PRN 29 (channel 9
Figure R. 16) highlight the effects of the two minute jamming windows at minutes 30,
40, 50, 60, 80, 90, 100, and 110. As the levels of jamming were increased from minutes
30 to 62 and from minutes 80 to 112 the C/N0 values were pulled down during each of
the two minute windows. At the jamming level at minute 60 and 110, the C/N0 was
reduced to zero. Other channels displayed similar characteristics of reduced C/Nc
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values. At the same times high intermittent peaks in C/N0 occurred as the receiver
tracking channels locked on to the jamming signal; values exceeding 50 dB-Hz were
observed during the jamming windows.
For the time period used for testing, the Doppler frequency values typically
ranged from +3.1 kHz to -4.9 kHz. This bias in Doppler frequency offset is discussed
in greater detail in Section 4.9.1. From minute 100 to 102, the swept CW pulled PRN
14 off to 20 kHz (Figure R.8). The change in tracking frequency depends on the
combination of the sweep time and the sweep width. The jamming signal must dwell
for a sufficient amount of time within the tracking channel bandwidth to capture the
tracking loop. No assessment was made of different center frequencies for the swept
CW tests. The frequency span was 20 kHz for the four jamming periods between
minute 30 and 62, while the frequency span was 10 kHz for the four jamming periods
between minute 80 and 112. Comparing the results for the two different frequency
spans for Figure R.7 and Figure R.8 it would appear that the narrower frequency span of
10 kHz actually was more effective in pulling the tracking channels off a greater
distance from the actual tracking frequencies. It must be remembered that the incoming
jamming signal is spread by the receiver generating a moving array of 1000 Hz spectral
lines that are sweeping through the tracking bandwidth of the receiver.

4.7.3 TEST 11 RESULTS (FIGURES CONTAINED IN APPENDIXS)
Data collected at a rate of one sample per second for Test 11 between 1500Z and
1710Z on 10 December 1998 were analyzed. The receivers were operated for the first
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30 minutes with no jamming. The aim of Test 11 was to investigate the impact of swept
CW jamming centered at LI at five jamming levels, and for three different frequency
spans (2 MHz, 200 kHz and 20 kHz) at a sweep rate of one second. Jamming was on
for two minutes followed by three minutes of no jamming allowing the XR5-M receiver
to regain lock. The attenuator was set at five different levels 85, 80, 75, 70 and 65 dB
resulting in J/S of 20.7, 25.7, 30.7, 35.7, and 40.7 dB as shown in Figure S.19.
The original Test 11 scenario was designed to maintain similar jamming
windows so that a comparison of the results of Test 9 with a sweep time of 20 seconds
could be made to Test 11 with a sweep time of one second as shown in Table 4.2. It is
recommended that Test 9 and Test 11 be repeated with no jamming windows of more
than eight minutes between jamming windows, based on the results of Test 10.
An overview of the satellite constellation status is provided in Figures S.l and
S.2 and the satellite PRN numbers used in the navigation solution in Figure S.3. Figure
S.4 relates the satellite PRNs being tracked by each receiver channel and Figures S.13
to S. 18 indicate the C/N0 for each of the tracking channels. Channel 11 was idle
throughout the test. GDOP values typically ranged between 2 and 5 over the first 50
minutes. As shown in Figure S.3, jamming at minute 51, and 101 resulted in the
receiver rapidly assigning different combinations of five PRNs to the navigation
solution. The large GDOP from minute 110 to 112 was associated with the receiver
losing lock (Figure S.5) and was reflected in the position error frozen in Figure S. 11 for
the same period. The large vertical spikes of C/N0, as a result of the jamming, are
evident in Figures S.13 to S.18.
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The five jamming windows between minute 30 and 52 were associated with a
two MHz frequency span at a sweep time of one second. From Figure S.7, it can be
seen that as the jamming level is increased for each window, the jamming pulls more
channels off frequency. At the maximum jamming level at minute 50 to 52, PRNs 14,
15, 5, 8 and 23 are all pulled off carrier lock. The C/ND plots for channels 10, 4, 2, 3,
and 6, respectively, highlight the reduction in C/N0.
The jamming windows for the periods minute 60 to 82 and minute 90 to 112
demonstrate an interesting characteristic as seen in Figures S.8 and S.9. During the two
minute jamming windows, the Doppler frequency offset appears to remain relatively
constant, similar to the pure CW jamming effects from Tests 3 to Test 8. The pulling
off of the Doppler frequency for PRN 22 only results after the tracking channel has
entered reacquire mode and then relocks on to the jamming at the beginning of the next
jamming window. From the C/N0 plot for Figure S. 15 channel 6 (PRN 22) it can be
seen that the tracking channel remains locked on to the jamming signal during jamming
windows for minute 90 to 92, 95 to 97, 100 to 102, 105 to 107, and 110 to 112.
The spectral characteristics of 1000 Hz lines in the swept CW jamming are
evident at minute 110 in Figure S.9. PRN 22, 14, 6, and 29 locked on to 9950, 1950,
950 and -2050 Hz respectively. PRN 1, 15, and 30 locked on to -3050 Hz, and PRN 21
locked on to -5050 Hz. Similar examples of the 1000 Hz spreading are evident in
Figures S.8 and S.9 for other jamming windows.
The impact of swept CW jamming on position error is reflected in Figures S. 10
and S. 11. The largest position error was 122.0 meters and occurred at minute 81.5. The
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relatively small position error was correlated with the small change in the XR5-M
receiver clock drift rate with one small spike at minute 81.5, as shown in Figure S.12.

4.8 CWJAMMINGIMPACTONPOSITIONERROR
This section was dedicated to the investigation of position error as a result of
CW jamming. Figures for Test 12 are included in Appendix T.

4.8.1 TEST 12 RESULTS (FIGURES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX T)
Data collected at a rate of one sample per second for Test 12 between 1430Z and
1705Z on 17 December 1998 were analyzed. The receivers operated for the first five
minutes with no jamming. The aim of Test 12 was to investigate the magnitude of
position error as a result of pure CW jamming centered at LI at a single jamming level.
Jamming was on for ten minutes followed by five minutes of no jamming allowing the
receiver to regain lock. The attenuator was set at 70 dB resulting in a J/S of 35.7 dB
versus time as shown in Figure T.22.
Based on the results of Test 10, and observations in this test, future testing
should ensure that more than eight minutes are allowed between jamming windows to
prevent jamming windows from creating a potential bias from previous jamming
windows. An example of this is shown in Figure T. 8. PRN 22 was locked on to the
jamming at minute 70. Jamming ceased at minute 75 and the tracking channel
attempted to reacquire. Five minutes later the jamming commenced and immediately
the tracking channel locked on to the jamming signal. Similar characteristics of PRN 5
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were observed during the first 50 minutes of the test. Although the potential existed to
generate a bias from one test window to the next, the effect on Test 12 was minimal
since PRN 5 was not used in the navigation solution during the first 50 minutes of the
test. Additionally, PRN 22 was not used in the navigation solution until after it gained a
valid lock at minute 136.
There were a total of 10 jamming windows of 10 minutes each as shown in
Figure T.22. Five minutes of no jamming allowed the receiver to regain 3D fix status
prior to the start of the next jamming window as evident in the position error plots as
shown in Figures T. 11 and T. 12. The ten jamming windows resulted in ten windows of
position error growth as shown in Figures T. 11 and T. 12.
An overview of the satellite constellation status is provided in Figures T.l and
T.2 and the satellite PRN numbers used in the navigation solution in Figure T.3. Figure
T.4 relates the satellite PRNs being tracked by each receiver channel. Figures T. 16 to
T.21 indicate the C/N0 for each of the tracking channels. Channel 11 was idle
throughout the test. GDOP values typically ranged between 2 and 5 over the first 50
minutes as shown in Figure T.5. Spikes in GDOP to 1000 were evident at minutes 60,
105,125,135 and 140. One spike in GDOP to 2000 occurred at minute 150.
An expansion of the Doppler frequency offset is provided in Figure T.7.
Channel 3 attempts to lock on to PRN 5 prior to jamming during the first five minutes
of the run. Once the jamming commences at minute 5, channel 3 (PRN 5) locks on to
the CW signal. Channel 2 (PRN 8) and channel 5 (PRN 23) lock on to the jamming
signal within the first few minutes. At minute 10, channel 10 (PRN 15) and channel 7
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(PRN 25) lock on to the CW jamming. At minute 15, jamming ceases and channel 3
attempts to reacquire which generates the wide vertical swaths in Figure T.7. The C/N0
plot in Figure T.17 for channel 3 (PRN 5) highlights the receiver channel tracking the
jamming signal followed by no signal periods.
From the Doppler frequency plots of Figures T.6 through T.9, it can be seen that
channels 1 and 12 (which are tracking PRN 1) do not lock on to the jamming during the
entire test. From the C/N0 plots in Figure T.16 (channel 1) and Figure T.21 (channel
12) the C/N0 is reduced during the jamming windows but not enough to cause the
tracking channel to lock on to the jamming signal.
At minute 20, jamming commences and quickly locks up PRNs 5, 8, and 23
(channels 3, 2, and 5 respectively). At minute 24, PRN 30 (channel 8) locks on to the
jamming signal. The four channels remain locked until jamming ceases at minute 30
(Figure T.7). At minute 35, PRNs 8 and 23 lock on to the jamming signal at -4063 Hz,
while PRN 5 locks on to jamming at -5063 Hz. From minute 10 to minute 40, channel
9 is assigned to PRN 16. The C/N0 plot in Figure T.20 shows that channel 9 is not
locked on to any signal during this window. At minute 40, channel 9 is reassigned to
PRN 14 and immediately locks on to the jamming (Figure T.7). At minute 50, PRNs 5,
8, 14, and 25 (channel 7) are locked on to the jamming signal. PRN 23 locks on to the
jamming at minute 53. At minute 65, PRNs 5, 8, 23, 15 are locked on to the jamming
signal. Five minutes later channel 5 is reassigned from PRN 23 to PRN 22 and locks on
to the jamming. PRN 14 also locks on to the jamming at minute 70. Similar results of
the tracking channels locking on to the jamming signals can be seen during jamming
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windows in Figure T.9. In particular jamming between minute 125 and 135 results in
PRNs 22, 6, 14, 30, 15, and 21 all locking on to the jamming signal.
Position error is highlighted in Figures T. 11 to T. 14. The large position error
evident in Figure T. 11 (due to scale of the plot) masks the position error for each of the
jamming windows in Figures T.12 and T.14.
Figure T. 10 provides an indication of the receiver status; a value of two
indicates that the receiver has "3D FIX" status, a value of one indicates the receiver
fixing is based on "2D FK" status, and a value of zero indicates that the receiver has
"NO VALID FDC". There were 13 events when the receiver switched from having a
valid fix to the "NO VALID FK" status during this test. For each of these events,
position error was measured and is provided in Table 4.5. The position error had a
mean of 12.492 km and a standard deviation of 6.565 km. Maximum position error at
the second prior to losing a valid fix was 22.999 km and the minimum was 3.730 km.
The position error plots of Figure T. 11 to Figure T. 14 include the position error
calculated after the receiver flags the position as no longer valid. This data was
provided in all position error plots to offer insight into what actually happened within
the receiver during the NO VALID FK periods.

4.9 SPECIAL OBSERVATIONS
This section discusses particular observations over the course of the six weeks of
testing. Some subjects did not merit further discussion in this section but were included
in Appendix H as a summary of lessons learned.
4-51

Time (seconds)

Position Error (meters)
22,264
17,183
10,586
15,551
17,220
6,881
16,269
5,938

593
684
2406
3204
3247
4045
4233
5003
6123
6201
7564
7597
8448

3,730

5,123
6,663
11,989
22,999

Table 4.5 - Position Error as Result of CW Jamming

4.9.1 BIAS INDOPPLER FREQUENCY OFFSET
An interesting observation was the overall negative bias or shift in all of the
Doppler frequency plots. Given the HP spectrum analyzer used, it was not possible to
measure the frequency output of the signal generator to a fine resolution of a few Hertz.
The first two weeks of testing were used to determine the bias in the signal generator by
comparing the output to Doppler frequencies that were jammed. This bias was
originally estimated at -150 Hz. All values in Tables 3.1 to 3.4, and Table 4.2 were
based on output frequencies corrected for this bias. The overall bias in the Doppler
frequency was first believed to be associated with satellite orbit and GPS receiver
relative velocity shifts. Upon further analysis, the bias in the Doppler frequencies was
associated with the receiver clock drift rate. The receiver clock drift rate observed
during the tests was approximately 5.6 x 10"7 seconds/second and equates to 167.9
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meters/second. Using 5.255 Hz per meter/second of Doppler shift at LI results in an
approximate shift of 882 Hz in the negative direction. This explains the overall
negative shift in Doppler frequencies to a range between approximately +3.1 kHz and
-4.9 kHz.
Once corrected for this bias the Doppler frequency offsets would be
approximately ± 4 kHz. Although GPS Doppler shift is reported as approximately ± 6
kHz [PAR96] for a stationary user at the earth's surface, this maximum value is limited
to latitudes above approximately 50 degrees. For a latitude of 40 degrees (ie. AFIT) the
maximum Doppler shift from a GPS satellite is approximately ± 4 kHz for a stationary
user at the earth's surface, which was consistent with the results observed.
Another small apparent bias was related to the elevation angle for gaining and
losing lock. Receiver channels that have signal lock tend to remain locked to lower
levels of C/No and hence lower satellite elevation angles than for initial acquisition.
This accounts for a very slight difference between the magnitude of the Doppler shifts
at the gaining and losing lock points when there is no jamming present.
This research has shown that it is feasible to selectively jam a satellite using the
Doppler frequency offset in the laboratory environment and that the technique may be
of benefit in an operational environment. In the future, "smart jamming" systems can
take advantage of the maximum amplitude spectral lines and Doppler shifted
frequencies of each satellite PRN code in order to jam C/A code GPS receivers.
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4.9.2 WAVE IN DOPPLER FREQUENCY OFFSET
During the first few minutes of data capture during the pre-test periods, a wave
in the Doppler frequency offset was observed. This effect was avoided by allowing the
receivers to operate for approximately fifteen minutes prior to capturing data. Two
examples of not waiting the full period demonstrate this wave in Doppler frequencies.
The change in receiver clock drift rate is associated with the change in Doppler
frequencies during first few minutes of operation, as seen in Figures L.6 and L. 12 and to
a lesser extent Figures S.6 and S.12.

4.9.3 INTERMITTENTLOSS OFLOCK ONPRN15
The loss of lock on PRN 15 in Test 2 was initially discussed in Test 2 results.
During Test 2 there was no jamming and no receiver channel seemed to exhibit a
decrease in C/N0 as might have been expected for an unexpected RF interference
source. Additionally, the loss of lock was not preceded by a short duration pulling of
the frequency as was typical for CW jamming. Based on these observations and
because there was no intentional jamming present, this was probably due to a problem
specific to PRN 15 and caused by some rapid form of interference which was not of RF
origin. Further looking at the azimuth (275 degrees true) and the elevation angle (26
degrees) at the time of loss of lock suggest possible masking of the GPS antenna by
AFIT Building 640 rooftop superstructure (Appendix A). This is a weak explanation
given that the incident was not observed on any other test during the six weeks of
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testing. The cause of this loss of lock for a 5 second duration on three occasions
remains unexplained.

4.9.4 MULTIPATHEFFECTS
Multipath effects on PRN 14 were observed during several tests including Test
1, 2, 5, and 6. The multipath effects were also observed during other tests; however,
jamming interference impacted the multipath effects. The replacement of the two
volute antenna with two choke ring antenna is recommended to reduce the multipath
effects for future testing purposes. Using a single antenna with two receivers should
allow the multipath effects to be removed since the errors would be common to both
receivers.
The periodic increase and decrease in C/N0 is a characteristic of multipath
effects observed at low satellite elevation angles. As the multipath signals change in
phase with the relative change in path lengths due to the relative motion of the satellite
and the user, the C/N0 increases and decreases periodically as a function of this phase
shift. Numerous examples of this were observed in the C/N0 plots for low elevation
satellites throughout the tests.

4.9.5 JAMMING USING STRONG SPECTRAL LINE CHARACTERISTICS
Offsetting of the jamming center frequency to match the strongest spectral line
of a given PRN code may be used to selectively jam a specific satellite as was observed
with PRN 30 in Test 6 at a moderately low J/S of 25.7 dB for the XR5-M receiver. The
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technique is limited to the jamming of C/A code receivers. Conceptually, several
jammers could be co-located each targeting the strongest spectral line for each PRN
code. In the future smart CW jammers may be optimized to jam specific satellites for a
given location and time of day. Based on initial positive results using the XR5-M
receiver, the concept of selectively jamming a received satellite signal by using a
combination of the required Doppler shift and a maximum spectral line for each PRN
code merits further study. Similar testing using other PRN codes and other C/A code
receivers is recommended.

4.10 DEVELOPMENT OF GPS JAMMING TRAINING
Several options exist for the development of dedicated "hands-on" GPS
jamming training. A homework assignment may be generated using the data (in
MATLAB® format) collected during this thesis. Students could conduct an analysis
using the "sptool" graphical user interface found in the MATLAB® signal processing
toolbox using actual data from the thesis. This would require a minimum knowledge of
MATLAB® and minimum preparation effort based on analysis already conducted. A
new set of data could also be collected, tailored, and provided to the students for
analysis.
A more advanced lab would require students to conduct actual GPS jamming
scenarios. This would offer a much more rewarding option for graduate students. The
746th Test Squadron at Holloman, AFB, is one of the recipients of AFIT graduates,
especially from the Navigation and Controls sequence. The opportunity to use
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hardware including GPS receivers, an HP Signal Generator, an HP Spectrum Analyzer
and an HP Variable Attenuator would be extremely beneficial in the students' follow-on
assignment. At least four laboratory hours should be dedicated to each group of
students. The first hour would be used as an equipment orientation, two hours would be
used to capture data at various jamming levels and jamming types, and the final hour
would be used to manipulate the data file into a useable text file and commence data
analysis.
A symbol file specifically designed to the lab could be generated or selection of
one of several symbol files already generated and installed on the 486 PCs could be
used depending on the level of detail required and the amount of MATLAB® coding
required of students. It is further recommended that the students use the symbol file
<kdsymbl3.sy> that is highlighted at Appendix C.
Finally, it is recommended that a jamming lab be preceded by a lab assignment
using the XR5-M receiver in non-differential mode. The jamming lab should use the
differential setup used during this thesis work. This would provide students a feel for
how differential techniques can be used to remove errors correlated between the two
receivers. A more advanced assignment could be used in which students would use the
XR5-M as an actual mobile receiver and would be required to generate specific
MATLAB® code in order to conduct single and double difference techniques.
On a slightly different note, but along the thoughts of training of jamming of
GPS, the following comment is offered. Currently, the Canadian Forces (CF) lacks
GPS jamming training devices for use during exercises. Also of concern is the impact
of the jamming of GPS on civil GPS users. Perhaps one of the simplest modifications
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for use in a maritime environment would be the modification of sonobuoys to transmit
jamming signals. The sonobuoy could be modified/designed as a miniature low power
GPS jammer for use at sea. A simple design could simply transmit a CW signal at LI.
More advanced designs would allow the user to program frequencies, pulse rates, and
even PRN codes. The use of GPS jammers at sea would also reduce the interference to
land based civilian users of GPS. The subject merits further investigation to meet
anticipated future needs for Navigation Warfare in the CF and could represent an ideal
thesis topic for future students at AFIT, the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey,
California, or the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

4.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY
The final equipment configuration used for Tests 1 to 12 is suitable for the
future instruction of jamming of C/A code GPS receivers. An ability to generate and
measure a jamming signal very accurately is highly desired. No measurements of actual
antenna and pre-amplifier gain were conducted. The impact of wideband noise and
pulsed CW on the XR5-M receiver was not investigated.
Although the Doppler frequency has a larger magnitude at lower elevation
angles, the rate of change of Doppler frequency is smaller at lower elevation angles.
Because of this, CW jamming signals will dwell for a longer period of time as the
frequency of the tracking channels for low elevation satellites moves through the
jamming window. In addition, satellites at low elevation had lower C/N0 making them
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more susceptible to jamming signals. In particular, PRNs 5, 8, 14 and 22 regularly
locked on to the CW jamming signal in Tests 3 to 8.
The success of selectively jamming PRN 30, in Test 6, by offsetting the
frequency of the CW jammer to target the maximum strength spectral line of PRN 30
merits further investigation based on initial results. It is feasible that a set of CW
jammers each targeted to specific satellites could prove to offer more effective CW
jamming techniques. In the electronic warfare world of counter moves, this may
suggest future research into the design of filters optimized for this particular set of
jamming frequencies.
A summary is provided in Table 4.6 for position error in the ECEF coordinate
system for Test 1 and 2 (for the case of no jamming). The method used in calculating
these values was discussed in Section 4.5.1.

Mean Error in ECEF
"X" Direction (meters)
Mean Error in ECEF
"Y" Direction (meters)
Mean Error in ECEF
"Z" Direction (meters)
Mean of 3D Error (meters)
Standard Deviation
of 3D Error (meters)

TEST1
-0.365

TEST 2
-0.292

0.0937

-0.428

-0.757

0.987

6.923
4.293

5.848
3.112

Table 4.6 - Summary of No Jamming Results for Tests 1 and 2
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Multipath effects contributed to the position error given the superstructure on
the AFIT Building 640 rooftop and the use of volute antenna. The magnitude of the
mean position error for both Test 1 and Test 2 was greatest in the Z direction.
In general terms, CW jamming generated much larger position errors prior to the
XR5-M setting the no-valid-fix flag while swept CW generated relatively small position
errors prior to the no-valid-fix flag being set.
Results of Tests 3 to 8, and Test 12, indicated that CW jamming caused the
tracking channels to actually lock on to the jamming signal. Position errors as a result
of CW jamming reached a mean of 12.492 km and a standard deviation of 6.565 km
prior to being flagged as an invalid fix during Test 12. Maximum position error at the
second prior to losing a valid fix was 22.999 km and the minimum was 3.730 km.
Position error plots of for all test results include the error in position as the receiver
continues calculating navigation information after it has flagged the position output as
invalid. This provided insight into the magnitude of position errors as result of
jamming before the XR5-M receiver regained valid fixing status.
CW jamming, with J/S of 20.7 to 35.7 dB, was investigated during Test 3 to 8.
Even the relatively low J/S of 20.7 dB during Test 3 rendered the receiver output invalid
given a long enough period for each of the tracking channels to acquire the jamming
signal (Figure K.6). Between minutes 74 and 84 for Test 3, 3D position error rapidly
grew (Figure K. 11) as a result of only one jammed satellite in the navigation solution
(PRN5inFigureK.7).
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The higher J/S of 35.7 dB during Test 5 captured more of the XR5-M receiver
channels in a shorter timeframe, as was evident in the jamming results commencing at
minute 80 (Figure M.6). Position error rapidly increased and the receiver ceased to
output navigation information by minute 100. The two minute spiking in the C/N0 and
Doppler offset frequency after minute 100 was attributed to a two minute time-out that
caused each of the tracking channels to reset when the channels were unable to
synchronize to the data frame within that period [BUT99].
The XR5-M receiver encountered difficulty in acquiring PRN 5, as was evident
for several minutes at the beginning of Tests 1, 6 and 12. At low elevation angles, PRN
5 and PRN 8 routinely locked on to the jamming signal throughout the test period. By
raising the elevation angle to 25 degrees in Test 8, PRN 5 was removed from the
navigation solution preventing an increase in position error from PRN 5.
There is obviously a trade-off to be made by the user between increasing GDOP
and hence position error in the absence of jamming by increasing the elevation mask
angle. The concept was intended as a potential quick fix for fielded C/A code GPS
receivers. The technique was shown to be a viable technique for removing jammed
satellites from the navigation solution depending on the J/S levels. Preplanning the
masking elevation angle on the part of the user is required in order to determine
acceptable GDOP for the given constellation, location, date and time. More
sophisticated techniques to combat RFI are discussed in Appendix G.
During swept CW testing in Tests 9,10 and 11, the 3D position errors were
relatively small compared to the previous CW test results. During Test 9, the maximum
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3D position error was 102 meters (excluding one intermittent spike). In Test 10 the
maximum 3D position error reached 220 meters, and from Test 11, the maximum 3D
error was 122 meters.
During swept CW testing in Test 10, the maximum deviation of the frequency in
the tracking channel occurred for the narrowest frequency span tested of 10 kHz,
centered on LI and with a sweep rate of 20 seconds. A J/S level of 30.7 dB from
minute 100 to minute 102 and a J/S level of 35.7 dB from minute 110 to 112 resulted in
a frequency deviation of up to 20 kHz in some of the tracking channels. The magnitude
of deviation was limited by two minute jamming windows and it appears that the
deviation would have continued to increase had the jamming been sustained (Figures
R.6 and R.8).
The negative bias of approximately 882 Hz in the Doppler frequency offset
figures for all tests was attributed to receiver clock drift rate.
In order to generate specific jamming frequency, the signal generator settings
were tweaked by measuring the jamming signals during the first two weeks of the pretest phase. In hindsight, the actual frequencies output by the signal generator had a bias
of approximately -280 Hz from the settings on the signal generator. The spectrum
analyzer measured the jamming signal within ±100 Hz of the actual signal seen at the
XR5-M receiver.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 SUMMARY
The concept of selectively jamming GPS satellites was demonstrated during the
course of the thesis research. In particular the generation of a jamming signal using a
combination of Doppler shifted jamming signals at a frequency offset and matched with
the unique maximum spectral line for each PRN code demonstrated the feasibility of
selectively jamming GPS satellites. The spreading of a Continuous Wave (CW) signal
into 1000 Hz spectral components within the XR5-M receiver was demonstrated over
several tests.
Overall the Hewlett Packard laboratory equipment functioned very well
providing the necessary tools to investigate CW and swept CW jamming effects on the
commercial-off-the-shelf Navstar XR5-M 12 channel Coarse Acquisition (C/A) code
Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. The linking of two XR5-M receivers
provided differentially corrected position information that was used to measure position
error as a result of the jamming signals.
At even moderately low Jam to Signal (J/S) values of 20.7 dB, over time, the
XR5-M receiver tracking channels were captured by the CW jamming. As J/S levels
were increased, the XR5-M receiver tracking channels were captured more quickly by
the jamming signals. Of particular interest, the XR5-M receiver tracking channels
actually locked on and tracked the CW jamming signals.
A single XR5-M receiver channel locked on to the CW jamming signal, and
used in the navigation solution, generated three dimensional (3D) position errors in
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excess of 12 kilometers prior to being flagged as an invalid position. Swept CW at high
J/S levels of 40.7 dB caused the position output of the XR5-M to freeze but maximum
position errors did not exceed 220 meters. Although the swept CW jamming generated
much smaller position error than CW jamming, swept CW did result in pulling the
tracking channels off frequency by up to 20 kHz.
The ability to access the numerous variables within the XR5-M receiver made it
an excellent choice for use in an educational environment. MATLAB® 5.2 proved to be
a valuable tool for manipulation and analysis of the data output by the XR5-M receiver.
A summary of lessons learned during the thesis research is provided in Appendix H and
includes such items that did not merit further discussion in this chapter.

5.2 CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results of this thesis research it is concluded that:
a. Differentially corrected XR5-M 3D position error in the absence of jamming
signals had a mean of less than seven meters and displayed periodic multipath
interference effects;
b. CW jamming caused the XR5-M receiver channels to actually gain lock and
track the CW signals;
c. CW jamming generated 3D position errors with a mean of 12.492 kilometers
and a maximum 3D position error of 22.999 kilometers prior to the XR5-M
receiver flagging the position as invalid;
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d. Swept CW jamming generated a maximum deviation of the tracking channel
frequency for the narrowest frequency span investigated of 10 kHz, centered
on LI and with the signal generator set to a sweep time of 20 seconds;
e. With one exception of an intermittent spike, swept CW interference generated
a maximum 3D position error of 220 meters;
f. The offset of center frequency to match with the maximum spectral lines of a
PRN code holds promising results at optimizing jamming for individual
satellites;
g. The equipment used during the research provides the necessary tools to
instruct the jamming of GPS signals;
h. The use of firmware version 3.7 in the XR5-M limited the number of
satellites in the navigation solution to only five and differential corrections
did not contain RTCM messages Type 20 and 21;
i. Increasing elevation masking angle improved the performance of the receiver
in a jamming environment but also raised the GDOP values increasing
position errors during no jamming windows;
j. The receiver design to use the "carrier lock" of a tracking channel to
determine the satellites used in calculating GDOP values can result in a
jammed satellite being selected for use in the navigation solution. As a result
GPS receiver designers should exercise caution using this technique for
receivers which will be used in strong RF interfering environments;
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k. Receiver clock drift rate of approximately 5.6 x 10"7 seconds/second resulted
in overall negative shift in all Doppler offset frequencies of approximately
882 Hz;
1. Maximum Doppler shift of GPS satellites at LI for a stationary user on the
earth's surface at a latitude of 40 degrees is approximately ± 4 kHz;
m.Data sets and MATLAB® code are available for AFIT and CFSAS students to
further investigate CW and swept CW jamming effects on a C/A code GPS
receiver; and,
n. The interference effects of wideband noise, replica C/A code and pulsed CW
were not investigated.
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
The thesis research provided an extremely interesting insight into the effects
CW and swept CW jamming on the XR5-M GPS receiver. Based on the results of the
twelve tests conducted, it is recommended that:
a. Further testing be conducted to investigate the potential use of matching CW
jamming frequency offset to the maximum spectral lines for each particular
PRN code;
b. Further testing be conducted to investigate swept CW interference with a
frequency span between one kHz and 10 kHz and for increased jamming
periods;
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c. For future testing the use of a choke ring antenna for the Base Station receiver
and an antenna for the Mobile station that is less susceptible to multipath
interference be investigated;
d. Further testing be carried out using wideband noise, pulsed CW, and replica
C/A codes as a jamming source;
e. An upgrade of the XR5-M firmware be investigated;
f. Increasing elevation angle to minimize jamming effects be used with an
understanding of the associated increase in GDOP;
g. Further testing of other C/A code GPS receivers under similar test conditions
be pursued;
h. For future testing of the XR5-M receiver, periods of more than eight minutes
of no jamming be scheduled between actual jamming windows to allow all
receiver channels to regain lock;
i. Designers of C/A code GPS receivers provide a user the ability to set valid fix
criteria such as maximum velocity and maximum altitude to minimize
position errors as a result of CW interference;
j. The Canadian Forces (CF) investigate the design and development of GPS
jammers into sonobuoys for use in a maritime environment;
k. Given the magnitude of position error as a result of CW jamming, that the CF
conduct testing of in-service GPS receivers to investigate potential
vulnerabilities/susceptibility to spoofing by the simple use of CW
interference;
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1. The CF incorporate jamming of GPS into all future major exercises involving
GPS equipped platforms; and
m. The CF consider anti-jam capabilities as a high priority for future GPS
equipment procurement.
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